Math 422
Coding Theory & Cryptography

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# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Introduction</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.A Error Detection and Correction</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.B Balanced Block Designs</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Linear Codes</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.A Encoding and Decoding</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.B Syndrome Decoding</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Hamming Codes</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Golay Codes</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 Finite Fields</strong></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6 Cyclic Codes</strong></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7 BCH Codes</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8 Cryptographic Codes</strong></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.A Symmetric-Key Cryptography</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.B Public-Key Cryptography</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.B.1 RSA Cryptosystem</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.B.2 Rabin Public-Key Cryptosystem</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.C Discrete Logarithm Schemes</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.C.1 Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.C.2 Okamoto Authentication Scheme</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.C.3 Digital Signature Standard</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.C.4 Silver–Pohlig–Hellman Discrete Logarithm Algorithm</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.D Cryptographic Error-Correcting Codes</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index 92
Preface

These lecture notes are designed for a one-semester course on error-correcting codes and cryptography at the University of Alberta. I would like to thank my colleagues, Professors Hans Brungs, Gerald Cliff, and Ted Lewis, for their written notes and examples, on which these notes are partially based (in addition to the references listed in the bibliography) and also Professor Jochen Kuttler, for pointing out several errors in an earlier version of these notes. The figures in this text were drawn with the high-level vector graphics language Asymptote (freely available at http://asymptote.sourceforge.net).
Chapter 1

Introduction

In the modern era, digital information has become a valuable commodity. For example, the news media, governments, corporations, and universities all exchange enormous quantities of digitized information every day. However, the transmission lines that we use for sending and receiving data and the magnetic media (and even semiconductor memory devices) that we use to store data are imperfect.

Since transmission line and storage devices are not 100% reliable devices, it has become necessary to develop ways of detecting when an error has occurred and, ideally, correcting it. The theory of error-correcting codes originated with Claude Shannon’s famous 1948 paper “A Mathematical Theory of Communication” and has grown to connect to many areas of mathematics, including algebra and combinatorics. The cleverness of the error-correcting schemes that have been developed since 1948 is responsible for the great reliability that we now enjoy in our modern communications networks, computer systems, and even compact disk players.

Suppose you want to send the message “Yes” (denoted by 1) or “No” (denoted by 0) through a noisy communication channel. We assume that there is a uniform probability $p < 1$ that any particular binary digit (often called a bit) could be altered, independent of whether or not any other bits are transmitted correctly. This kind of transmission line is called a binary symmetric channel. (In a $q$-ary symmetric channel, the digits can take on any of $q$ different values and the errors in each digit occur independently and manifest themselves as the $q - 1$ other possible values with equal probability.)

If a single bit is sent, a binary channel will be reliable only a fraction $1 - p$ of the time. The simplest way of increasing the reliability of such transmissions is to send the message twice. This relies on the fact that if $p$ is small, the probability $p^2$ of two errors occurring is very small. The probability of no errors occurring is $(1 - p)^2$. The probability of one error occurring is $2p(1 - p)$ since there are two possible ways this could happen. While reception of the original message is more likely than any other particular result if $p < 1/2$, we need $p < 1 - 1/\sqrt{2} \approx 0.29$ to be sure that the correct message is received most of the time.
If the message 11 or 00 is received, either 0 or 2 errors have occurred. Thus, we would expect with conditional probability
\[
\frac{(1 - p)^2}{(1 - p)^2 + p^2}
\]
that the sent message was “Yes” or “No”, respectively. If the message 01 or 10 is received we know for sure that an error has occurred, but we have no way of knowing, or even reliably guessing, what message was sent (it could with equal probability have been the message 00 or 11). Of course, we could simply ask the sender to retransmit the message; however this would now require a total of 4 bits of information to be sent. If errors tend to occur frequently, it would make more sense to send three, instead of two, copies of the original data in a single message. That is, we should send “111” for “Yes” or “000” for “No”. Then, if only one bit-flip occurs, we can always guess, with good reliability what the original message was. For example, suppose “111” is sent. Then of the eight possible received results, the patterns “111”, “011”, “101”, and “110” would be correctly decoded as “Yes”. The probability of the first pattern occurring is \((1 - p)^3\) and the probability for each of the next three possibilities is \(p(1 - p)^2\). Hence the probability that the message is correctly decoded is
\[
(1 - p)^3 + 3p(1 - p)^2 = (1 - p)^2(1 + 2p) = 1 - 3p^2 + 2p^3.
\]
In other words, if \(p\) is small, the probability of a decoding error, \(3p^2 - 2p^3\), is very small. This kind of data encoding is known as a repetition code. For example, suppose that \(p = 0.001\), so that on average one bit in every thousand is garbled. Triple-repetition decoding ensures that only about one bit in every 330,000 is garbled.

1.A Error Detection and Correction

Despite the inherent simplicity of repetition coding, sending the entire message like this in triplicate is not an efficient means of error correction. Our goal is to find optimal encoding and decoding schemes for reliable error correction of data sent through noisy transmission channels.

The sequences “000” and “111” in the previous example are known as binary codewords. Together they comprise a binary code. More generally, we introduce the following definitions.

**Definition:** Let \(q \in \mathbb{N}\). A \(q\)-ary codeword is a finite sequence of symbols, where each symbol is chosen from the alphabet (set) \(F_q = \{\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \ldots, \lambda_q\}\). Typically, we will take \(F_q\) to be the set \(Z_q = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, q - 1\}\). (We use the symbol \(\doteq\) to emphasize a definition, although the notation \(:=\) is more common.) The codeword itself can be treated as a vector in the space \(F_q^n = F_q \times F_q \times \ldots F_q\), \(n\) times.
• A binary codeword, corresponding to the case \( q = 2 \), is just a finite sequence of 0s and 1s.

• A ternary codeword, corresponding to the case \( q = 3 \), is just a finite sequence of 0s, 1s, and 2s.

Definition: A \( q \)-ary code is a set of \( M \) codewords, where \( M \in \mathbb{N} \) is known as the size of the code.

• The set of all words in the English language is a code over the 26-letter alphabet \( \{A, B, \ldots, Z\} \).

One important aspect of all error-correcting schemes is that the extra information that accomplishes this must itself be transmitted and is hence subject to the same kinds of errors as is the data. So there is no way to guarantee accuracy; one simply attempts to make the probability of accurate decoding as high as possible.

A good code is one in which the codewords have little resemblance to each other. If the codewords are sufficiently different, we will soon see that it is possible not only to detect errors but even to correct them, using nearest-neighbour decoding, where one maps the received vector back to the closest nearby codeword.

• The set of all 10-digit telephone numbers in the United Kingdom is a 10-ary code of length 10. It is possible to use a code of over 82 million 10-digit telephone numbers (enough to meet the needs of the U.K.) such that if just one digit of any phone number is misdialed, the correct connection can still be made. Unfortunately, little thought was given to this, and as a result, frequently misdialed numbers do occur in the U.K. (as well as in North America)!

Definition: We define the Hamming distance \( d(x, y) \) between two codewords \( x \) and \( y \) of \( F_q^n \) as the number of places in which they differ.

Remark: Notice that \( d(x, y) \) is a metric on \( F_q^n \) since it is always non-negative and satisfies

1. \( d(x, y) = 0 \iff x = y \),
2. \( d(x, y) = d(y, x) \) for all \( x, y \in F_q^n \),
3. \( d(x, y) \leq d(x, z) + d(z, y) \) for all \( x, y, z \in F_q^n \).

The first two properties are immediate consequences of the definition, while the third property, known as the triangle inequality, follows from the simple observation that \( d(x, y) \) is the minimum number of digit changes required to change \( x \) to \( y \), whereas if we were to change \( x \) to \( y \) by first changing \( x \) to \( z \) and then changing \( z \) to \( y \), we would require \( d(x, z) + d(z, y) \) changes. Thus \( d(x, y) \leq d(x, z) + d(z, y) \). This important inequality is illustrated in Fig 1.1.
Remark: We can use property \(2\) to rewrite the triangle inequality as
\[
d(x, y) - d(y, z) \leq d(x, z) \quad \forall x, y, z \in F_q^n.
\]

Definition: The weight \(w(x)\) of a \(q\)-ary codeword \(x\) is the number of nonzero digits in \(x\).

Remark: Let \(x\) and \(y\) be binary codewords in \(\mathbb{Z}_2^n\). Then \(d(x, y) = w(x - y) = w(x) + w(y) - 2w(xy)\). Here, \(x - y\) and \(xy\) are computed mod 2, digit by digit.

Remark: Let \(x\) and \(y\) be codewords in \(\mathbb{Z}_q^n\). Then \(d(x, y) = w(x - y)\). Here, \(x - y\) is computed mod \(q\), digit by digit.

Definition: Let \(C\) be a code in \(F_q^n\). We define the minimum distance \(d(C)\) of the code:
\[
d(C) = \min\{d(x, y) : x, y \in C, x \neq y\}.
\]

Remark: In view of the previous discussion, a good code is one with a relatively large minimum distance.

Definition: An \((n, M, d)\) code is a code of length \(n\), containing \(M\) codewords and having minimum distance \(d\).
• For example, here is a \((5, 4, 3)\) code, consisting of four codewords from \(\mathbb{Z}_2^5\), which are at least a distance 3 from each other:

\[
C_3 = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

Upon considering each of the \(\binom{4}{2} = \frac{4 \times 3}{2} = 6\) pairs of distinct codewords (rows), we see that the minimum distance of \(C_3\) is indeed 3. With this code, we can either (i) detect up to two errors (since the members of each pair of distinct codewords are more than a distance 2 apart), or (ii) detect and correct a single error (since, if only a single error has occurred, the received vector will still be closer to the transmitted codeword than to any other).

The following theorem (cf. Fig. 1.2) shows how this works in general.

**Theorem 1.1** (Error Detection and Correction): In a symmetric channel with error-probability \(p > 0\),

(i) a code \(C\) can detect up to \(t\) errors in every codeword \(\iff d(C) \geq t + 1\);

(ii) a code \(C\) can correct up to \(t\) errors in any codeword \(\iff d(C) \geq 2t + 1\).

![Figure 1.2](image-url)

Figure 1.2: Detection of up to \(t\) errors in a transmitted codeword \(x\) requires that all other codewords \(y\) lie outside a sphere \(S\) of radius \(t\) centered on \(x\). Correction of up to \(t\) errors requires that no sphere of radius \(t\) centered about any other codeword \(y\) overlaps with \(S\).

Proof:

(i) “\(\leq\)” Suppose \(d(C) \geq t + 1\). Let a codeword \(x\) be transmitted such that \(t\) or fewer errors are introduced, resulting in a new vector \(y \in F_q^n\). Then \(d(x, y) = w(x - y) \leq t < t + 1 \leq d(C)\), so the received vector cannot be another codeword. Hence \(t\) errors can be detected.

“\(\Rightarrow\)” Suppose \(C\) can detect up to \(t\) errors. If \(d(C) < t + 1\), then there is some pair of codewords \(x\) and \(y\) with \(d(x, y) \leq t\). Since it is possible to send the
codeword $x$ and receive another codeword $y$ by the introduction of $t$ errors, we conclude that $C$ cannot detect $t$ errors, contradicting our premise. Hence $d(C) \geq t + 1$.

(ii) “⇐” Suppose $d(C) \geq 2t + 1$. Let a codeword $x$ be transmitted such that $t$ or fewer errors are introduced, resulting in a new vector $y \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ satisfying $d(x, y) \leq t$. If $x'$ is a codeword other than $x$, then $d(x, x') \geq 2t + 1$ and the triangle inequality $d(x, x') \leq d(x, y) + d(y, x')$ implies that $d(y, x') \geq d(x, x') - d(x, y) \geq 2t + 1 - t = t + 1 > t \geq d(y, x)$.

Hence the received vector $y$ is closer to $x$ than to any other codeword $x'$, making it possible to identify the original transmitted codeword $x$ correctly.

“⇒” Suppose $C$ can correct up to $t$ errors. If $d(C) < 2t + 1$, there is some pair of distinct codewords $x$ and $x'$ with distance $d(x, x') \leq 2t$. If $d(x, x') \leq t$, let $y = x'$, so that $0 \leq d(y, x') < d(y, x) \leq t$. Otherwise, if $t < d(x, x') \leq 2t$, construct a vector $y$ by changing $t$ of the digits of $x$ that are in disagreement with $x'$ to their corresponding values in $x'$, so that $0 < d(y, x') \leq d(y, x) = t$.

In either case, it is possible to send the codeword $x$ and receive the vector $y$ due to $t$ or fewer transmission errors. But since $d(y, x') \leq d(y, x)$, the received vector $y$ cannot not be unambiguously decoded as $x$ using nearest-neighbour decoding. This contradicts our premise. Hence $d(C) \geq 2t + 1$.

**Corollary 1.1.1:** If a code $C$ has minimum distance $d$, then $C$ can be used either (i) to detect up to $d - 1$ errors or (ii) to correct up to $\lfloor \frac{d-1}{2} \rfloor$ errors in any codeword. Here $\lfloor x \rfloor$ represents the greatest integer less than or equal to $x$.

A good $(n, M, d)$ code has small $n$ (for rapid message transmission), large $M$ (to maximize the amount of information transmitted), and large $d$ (to be able to correct many errors). A primary goal of coding theory is to find codes that optimize $M$ for fixed values of $n$ and $d$.

**Definition:** Let $A_q(n, d)$ be the largest value of $M$ such that there exists a $q$-ary $(n, M, d)$ code.

- Since we have already constructed a $(5, 4, 3)$ code, we know that $A_2(5, 3) \geq 4$. We will soon see that 4 is in fact the maximum possible value of $M$; i.e. $A_2(5, 3) = 4$.

To help us tabulate $A_q(n, d)$, let us first consider the following special cases:

**Theorem 1.2 (Special Cases): For any values of $q$ and $n$,**

(i) $A_q(n, 1) = q^n$;

(ii) $A_q(n, n) = q$. 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Proof:

(i) When the minimum distance \( d = 1 \), we require only that the codewords be distinct. The largest code with this property is the whole of \( F_q^n \), which has \( M = q^n \) codewords.

(ii) When the minimum distance \( d = n \), we require that any two distinct codewords differ in all \( n \) positions. In particular, this means that the symbols appearing in the first position must be distinct, so there can be no more than \( q \) codewords. A \( q \)-ary repetition code of length \( n \) is an example of an \((n, q, n)\) code, so the bound \( A_q(n, n) = q \) can actually be realized.

Remark: There must be at least two codewords for \( d(C) \) even to be defined. This means that \( A_q(n, d) \) is not defined if \( d > n \), since \( d(x, y) = w(x - y) \leq n \) for distinct codewords \( x, y \in F_q^n \).

Lemma 1.1 (Reduction Lemma): If a \( q \)-ary \((n, M, d)\) code exists, with \( d \geq 2 \), there also exists an \((n - 1, M, d - 1)\) code.

Proof: Given an \((n, M, d)\) code, let \( x \) and \( y \) be codewords such that \( d(x, y) = d \) and choose any column where \( x \) and \( y \) differ. Delete this column from all codewords. Since \( d \geq 2 \), the codewords that result are distinct and form a \((n - 1, M, d - 1)\) code.

Theorem 1.3 (Even Values of \( d \)): Suppose \( d \) is even. Then a binary \((n, M, d)\) code exists \(\iff\) a binary \((n - 1, M, d - 1)\) code exists.

Proof:

“\(\Rightarrow\)” This follows from Lemma 1.1.

“\(\Leftarrow\)” Suppose \( C \) is a binary \((n - 1, M, d - 1)\) code. Let \( \hat{C} \) be the code of length \( n \) obtained by extending each codeword \( x \) of \( C \) by adding a parity bit \( w(x) \mod 2 \). This makes the weight \( w(\hat{x}) \) of every codeword \( \hat{x} \) of \( \hat{C} \) even. Then \( d(x, y) = w(x) + w(y) - 2w(xy) \) must be even for every pair of codewords \( x \) and \( y \) in \( \hat{C} \), so \( d(\hat{C}) \) is even. Note that \( d - 1 = d(C) \leq d(\hat{C}) \leq d \). But \( d - 1 \) is odd, so in fact \( d(\hat{C}) = d \). Thus \( \hat{C} \) is a \((n, M, d)\) code.

Corollary 1.3.1 (Maximum Code Size for Even \( d \)): If \( d \) is even, then \( A_2(n, d) = A_2(n - 1, d - 1) \).

This result means that we only need to calculate \( A_2(n, d) \) for odd \( d \). In fact, in view of Theorem 1.1 there is little advantage in considering codes with even \( d \) if the goal is error correction. In Table 1.1 we present values of \( A_2(n, d) \) for \( n \leq 16 \) and for odd values of \( d \leq 7 \).

As an example, we now compute the value \( A_2(5, 3) \) entered in Table 1.1 after establishing a useful simplification, beginning with the following definition.
1.A. ERROR DETECTION AND CORRECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$d = 3$</th>
<th>$d = 5$</th>
<th>$d = 7$</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>256–340</td>
<td>36–37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Maximum code size $A_2(n,d)$ for $n \leq 16$ and $d \leq 7$.

**Definition:** Two $q$-ary codes are *equivalent* if one can be obtained from the other by a combination of

(A) permutation of the columns of the code;

(B) relabelling the symbols appearing in a fixed column.

**Remark:** Note that the distances between codewords are unchanged by each of these operations. That is, equivalent codes have the same $(n, M, d)$ parameters and can correct the same number of errors. Furthermore, in a $q$-ary symmetric channel, the error-correction performance of equivalent codes will be identical.

- The binary code

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{pmatrix}
$$

is seen to be equivalent to our previous $(5, 4, 3)$ code $C_3$ by interchanging the first two columns and then relabelling $0 \leftrightarrow 1$ in the first and fourth columns of the resulting matrix.

**Lemma 1.2 (Zero Vector):** Any code over an alphabet containing the symbol $0$ is equivalent to a code containing the zero vector $0$.

Proof: Given a code of length $n$, choose any codeword $x_1x_2\ldots x_n$. For each $i$ such that $x_i \neq 0$, apply the relabelling $0 \leftrightarrow x_i$ to the symbols in the $i$th column.
• Armed with the above lemma and the concept of equivalence, it is now easy to prove that \( A_2(5, 3) = 4 \). Let \( C \) be a \((5, M, 3)\) code with \( M \geq 4 \). Without loss of generality, we may assume that \( C \) contains the zero vector (if necessary, by replacing \( C \) with an equivalent code). Then there can be no codewords with just one or two 1s since \( d = 3 \). Also, there can be at most one codeword with four or more 1s; otherwise there would be two codewords with at least three 1s in common positions and less than a distance 3 apart. Since \( M \geq 4 \), there must be at least two codewords containing exactly three 1s. By rearranging columns, if necessary, we see that the code contains the codewords

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\]

There is no way to add any more codewords containing exactly three 1s and we can also now rule out the possibility of five 1s. This means that there can be at most four codewords, that is, \( A_2(5, 3) \leq 4 \). Since we have previously shown that \( A_2(5, 3) \geq 4 \), we deduce that \( A_2(5, 3) = 4 \).

**Remark:** A fourth codeword, if present in the above code, must have exactly four 1s. The only possible position for the 0 symbol is in the middle position, so the fourth codeword must be 11011. We then see that the resulting code is equivalent to \( C_3 \) and hence \( A_2(5, 3) \) is unique, up to equivalence.

The above trial-and-error approach becomes impractical for large codes. In some of these cases, an important bound, known as the sphere-packing or Hamming bound, can be used to establish that a code is as large as possible for given values of \( n \) and \( d \).

**Lemma 1.3** (Counting): A sphere of radius \( t \) in \( F_q^n \), with \( 0 \leq t \leq n \), contains exactly

\[
\sum_{k=0}^{t} \binom{n}{k} (q-1)^k
\]

vectors.

**Proof:** The number of vectors that are a distance \( k \) from a fixed vector in \( F_q^n \) is \( \binom{n}{k} (q-1)^k \), because there are \( \binom{n}{k} \) choices for the \( k \) positions that differ from those of the fixed vector and there are \( q-1 \) values that can be assigned independently to each of these \( k \) positions. Summing over the possible values of \( k \), we obtain the desired result.

**Theorem 1.4** (Sphere-Packing Bound): A \( q \)-ary \((n, M, 2t + 1)\) code satisfies

\[
M \sum_{k=0}^{t} \binom{n}{k} (q-1)^k \leq q^n. \tag{1.1}
\]
Proof: By the triangle inequality, any two spheres of radius \( t \) that are centered on distinct codewords will have no vectors in common. The total number of vectors in the \( M \) spheres of radius \( t \) centered on the \( M \) codewords is thus given by the left-hand side of the above inequality; this number can be no more than the total number \( q^n \) of vectors in \( F_q^n \).

- For our binary \((5, 4, 3)\) code, Eq. (1.1) gives the bound \( M(1 + 5) \leq 2^5 = 32 \), which implies that \( A_2(5, 3) \leq 5 \). We have already seen that \( A_2(5, 3) = 4 \). This emphasizes that just because some set of numbers \( \{n, M, t\} \) satisfy Eq. (1.1), there is no guarantee that such a code actually exists.

**Definition:** A perfect code is a code for which equality occurs in (1.1). For such a code, the \( M \) spheres of radius \( t \) centered on the codewords fill the whole space \( F_q^n \) completely, without overlapping.

**Remark:** The codes that consist of a single codeword (taking \( t = n \) and \( M = 1 \)), codes that contain all vectors of \( F_q^n \) (with \( t = 0 \) and \( M = q^n \)), and the binary repetition code (with \( t = (n-1)/2 \) and \( M = 2 \)) of odd length \( n \) are trivially perfect codes.

**Problem 1.1:** Prove that

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{n} \binom{n}{t} (q-1)^t = q^n.
\]

Each term in this sum is the number of vectors of weight \( t \) in \( F_q^n \). When we sum over all possible values of \( t \), we obtain \( q^n \), the total number of vectors in \( F_q^n \).

Alternatively, we see directly from the Binomial Theorem that

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{n} \binom{n}{t} (q-1)^t = (1 + (q-1))^n = q^n.
\]

**Problem 1.2:** Show that a \( q \)-ary \((n, M, d)\) code must satisfy \( M \leq q^{n-d+1} \). Hint: what can you say about the vectors obtained by deleting the last \( d-1 \) positions of all codewords? It might help to first consider the special cases \( d = 1 \) and \( d = 2 \).

If you delete the last \( d-1 \) positions of all codewords, the resulting vectors must be distinct, or else the codewords could not be a distance \( d \) apart from each other. Since the number of distinct \( q \)-ary vectors of length \( n - d + 1 \) is \( q^{n-d+1} \), the number of codewords \( M \) must be less or equal to this number.
Problem 1.3: (a) Given an \((n, M, d)\) \(q\)-ary code \(C\), let \(N_i : i = 0, 1, \ldots, q - 1\) be the number of codewords ending with the symbol \(i\). Prove that there exists some \(i\) for which \(N_i \geq M/q\).

This follows from the pigeon-hole principle: construct \(q\) boxes, one for each possible final digit. If we try to stuff the \(M\) codewords into the \(q\) boxes, at least one box must contain \(\lceil M/q \rceil\) or more codewords.

One can also establish this result directly, with a proof by contradiction. Suppose that \(N_i < M/q\) for each \(i = 0, 1, \ldots, q - 1\). One would then obtain the contradiction
\[
M = \sum_{i=0}^{q-1} N_i < \sum_{i=0}^{q-1} M/q \leq M.
\]

(b) Let \(C'\) be the code obtained by deleting the final symbol from each codeword in \(C\). Show that \(C'\) contains an \((n - 1, \lceil M/q \rceil)\) subcode having minimum distance \(d\) or greater (that is, \(C'\) contains at least \(\lceil M/q \rceil\) codewords that are still a distance \(d\) or more apart).

From part (a), we know that \(C\) contains at least \(\lceil M/q \rceil\) codewords ending in the same symbol. These codewords form a subcode of \(C\) having minimum distance at least \(d\). When we delete the last symbol from the codewords in this subcode, their minimum distance does not change: they form a \((n - 1, \lceil M/q \rceil)\) subcode of \(C'\) having minimum distance at least \(d\).

(c) Conclude that
\[
A_q(n, d) \leq q A_q(n - 1, d).
\]

Recall that \(A_q(n, d)\) is the largest value of \(M\) such that there exists a \(q\)-ary \((n, M, d)\) code.

Let \(C\) be an \((n, A_q(n, d), d)\) code. We know from part (b) that we can construct an \((n - 1, [A_q(n, d)/q])\) subcode from \(C\) with minimum distance \(d' \geq d\). Let \(x\) and \(y\) be two codewords in the subcode with \(d(x, y) = d'\). Replace \(d' - d\) positions of \(x\) and \(y\) where they disagree with zeros, thereby forming an \((n - 1, [A_q(n, d)/q], d)\) subcode. This shows that
\[
A_q(n - 1, d) \geq \frac{A_q(n, d)}{q}.
\]

Problem 1.4: Let \(C\) be a code with even distance \(d = 2m\). Let \(t\) be the maximum number of errors that \(C\) can be guaranteed to correct.

(a) Express \(t\) in terms of \(m\).

To correct \(t\) errors we need \(d \geq 2t + 1\); that is, \(t \leq \frac{d - 1}{2}\). The maximum value of \(t\) is
\[
t = \left\lfloor \frac{d - 1}{2} \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor \frac{m - 1}{2} \right\rfloor = m - 1.
\]
(b) Prove that $C$ cannot be a perfect code. That is, there is no integer $M$ such that

$$M \sum_{k=0}^{t} \binom{n}{k} (q - 1)^k = q^n.$$  

For $C$ to be perfect, each vector in $F_q^n$ would have to be contained in exactly one of the $M$ codeword spheres of radius $t$. However, we know that there are codewords $x$ and $y$ with $d(x, y) = 2m = 2t + 2$. Consider the vector $v$ obtained by changing $t + 1$ of those digits where $x$ disagrees with $y$ to the corresponding digits in $y$. Then $d(v, x) = d(v, y) = t + 1$, so $v$ does not lie within the codeword spheres about $x$ or $y$. If $v$ were within a distance $t$ from another codeword $z$, the triangle inequality would imply that

$$d(x, z) \leq d(x, v) + d(v, z) = t + 1 + t = 2t + 1,$$

contradicting the fact that the code has minimum distance $2t + 2$. Thus $v$ does not lie in any codeword sphere. That is, $C$ is not a perfect code.

**1.B Balanced Block Designs**

**Definition:** A balanced block design consists of a collection of $b$ subsets, called blocks, of a set $S$ of $v$ points such that

(i) each point lies in exactly $r$ blocks;

(ii) each block contains exactly $k$ points;

(iii) each pair of points occurs together in exactly $\lambda$ blocks.

Such a design is called a $(b, v, r, k, \lambda)$ design.

- Let $S = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7\}$ and consider the subsets $\{1, 2, 4\}$, $\{2, 3, 5\}$, $\{3, 4, 6\}$, $\{4, 5, 7\}$, $\{5, 6, 1\}$, $\{6, 7, 2\}$, $\{7, 1, 3\}$ of $S$. Each number lies in exactly 3 blocks, each block contains 3 numbers, and each pair of numbers occurs together in exactly 1 block. The six lines and circle in Fig. 1.3 represent the blocks. Hence these subsets form a $(7, 7, 3, 3, 1)$ design.

**Remark:** The parameters $(b, v, r, k, \lambda)$ are not independent. Consider the set of ordered pairs

$$T = \{(x, B) : x \text{ is a point, } B \text{ is a block, } x \in B\}.$$  

Since each of the $v$ points lie in $r$ blocks, there must be a total of $vr$ ordered pairs in $T$. Alternatively, we know that since there are $b$ blocks and $k$ points in each
block, we can form exactly \( bk \) such pairs. Thus \( bk = vr \). Similarly, by considering the set

\[
U = \{(x, y, B) : x, y \text{ are distinct points, } B \text{ is a block, } x, y \in B\},
\]

we deduce

\[
bk(k - 1) = \lambda v(v - 1),
\]

which, using \( bk = vr \), simplifies to \( r(k - 1) = \lambda(v - 1) \).

**Definition:** A block design is *symmetric* if \( v = b \) (and hence \( k = r \)); that is, the number of points and blocks is identical. For brevity, this is called a \((v, k, \lambda)\) design.

**Definition:** The *incidence matrix* of a block design is a \( v \times b \) matrix with entries

\[
a_{ij} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x_i \in B_j, \\
0 & \text{if } x_i \notin B_j,
\end{cases}
\]

where \( x_i, i = 1, \ldots, v \) are the design points and \( B_j, j = 1, \ldots, b \) are the design blocks.

- For our above \((7, 3, 1)\) symmetric design, the incidence matrix \( A \) is

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1
\end{pmatrix}.
\]
We now construct a \( (7, 16, 3) \) binary code \( C \) consisting of the zero vector \( 0 \), the unit vector \( 1 \), the 7 rows of \( A \), and the 7 rows of the matrix \( B \) obtained from \( A \) by the relabelling \( 0 \leftrightarrow 1 \):

\[
C = \begin{pmatrix}
0 \\
1 \\
a_1 \\
a_2 \\
a_3 \\
a_4 \\
a_5 \\
a_6 \\
a_7 \\
b_1 \\
b_2 \\
b_3 \\
b_4 \\
b_5 \\
b_6 \\
b_7
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

To find the minimum distance of this code, note that each row of \( A \) has exactly three 1s (since \( r = 3 \)) and any two distinct rows of \( A \) have exactly one 1 in common (since \( \lambda = 1 \)). Hence \( d(a_i, a_j) = 3 + 3 - 2(1) = 4 \) for \( i \neq j \). Likewise, \( d(b_i, b_j) = 4 \).

Furthermore,

\[
d(0, a_i) = 3, \quad d(0, b_i) = 4, \\
d(1, a_i) = 4, \quad d(1, b_i) = 3, \\
d(a_i, b_i) = d(0, 1) = 7,
\]

for \( i = 1, \ldots, 7 \). Finally, \( a_i \) and \( b_j \) disagree in precisely those places where \( a_i \) and \( a_j \) agree, so

\[
d(a_i, b_j) = w(a_i - b_j) = w(1 - (a_i - a_j)) = w(1) + w(a_i - a_j) - 2w(a_i - a_j) = 7 - w(a_i - a_j) = 7 - d(a_i, a_j) = 7 - 4 = 3, \quad \text{for } i \neq j.
\]

Thus \( C \) is a \( (7, 16, 3) \) code, which in fact is perfect, since the equality in Eq. (1.1) is satisfied:

\[
16 \left( \binom{7}{0} + \binom{7}{1} \right) = 16(1 + 7) = 128 = 2^7.
\]

The existence of a perfect binary \( (7, 16, 3) \) code establishes \( A_2(7, 3) = 16 \), so we have now established another entry of Table 1.1.

Modern books are assigned an International Standard Book Number (ISBN), a 10-digit codeword, by the publisher. For example, Hill [1997] has the ISBN number 0-19-853803-0. The three hyphens separate the codeword into four fields. The first field specifies the language (0 means English), the second field indicates the publisher (19 means Oxford University Press), the third field (853803) is the book number assigned by the publisher, and the final digit (0) is a check digit. If the digits of the ISBN number are denoted \( x = x_1 \ldots x_{10} \), then the check digit \( x_{10} \) is chosen as

\[
x_{10} = \sum_{k=1}^{9} kx_k \pmod{11}.
\]

If \( x_{10} \) turns out to be 10, an \( X \) is printed in place of the final digit. The tenth digit serves to make the weighted check sum

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{10} kx_k = \sum_{k=1}^{9} kx_k + 10 \sum_{k=1}^{9} kx_k = 11 \sum_{k=1}^{9} kx_k = 0 \pmod{11}.
\]

So, if \( \sum_{k=1}^{10} kx_k \neq 0 \pmod{11} \), we know that an error has occurred. In fact, the ISBN number is able to (i) detect a single error or (ii) detect a transposition error that results in two digits (not necessarily adjacent) being interchanged.

If a single error occurs, then some digit \( x_j \) is received as \( x_j + e \) with \( e \neq 0 \). Then

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{10} kx_k + je = je \pmod{11} \neq 0 \pmod{11} \text{ since } j \text{ and } e \text{ are nonzero.}
\]

Let \( y \) be the vector obtained by exchanging the digits \( x_j \) and \( x_k \) in an ISBN code \( x \), where \( j \neq k \). Then

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{10} ix_i + (k - j)x_j + (j - k)x_k = (k - j)x_j + (j - k)x_k \pmod{11}
\]

\[
= (k - j)(x_j - x_k) \pmod{11} \neq 0 \pmod{11}
\]

if \( x_j \neq x_k \).

In the above arguments we have used the property of the field \( \mathbb{Z}_{11} \) (the integers modulo 11) that the product of two nonzero elements is always nonzero (since \( ab = 0 \) and \( a \neq 0 \Rightarrow a^{-1}ab = 0 \Rightarrow b = 0 \)). Consequently, \( \mathbb{Z}_{ab} \) with \( a, b > 1 \) cannot be a field because the product \( ab = 0 \pmod{ab} \), even though \( a \neq 0 \) and \( b \neq 0 \). Note also that there can be no inverse \( a^{-1} \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_{ab} \), for otherwise \( b = a^{-1}ab = a^{-1}0 = 0 \pmod{ab} \).

In fact, \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) is a field if and only if \( p \) is prime (cf. Theorem 5). For this reason, the ISBN code is calculated in \( \mathbb{Z}_{11} \) and not in \( \mathbb{Z}_{10} \), where \( 2 \cdot 5 = 0 \pmod{10} \).

The ISBN code cannot be used to correct errors unless we know \textit{a priori} which digit is in error. To do this, we first need to construct a table of inverses modulo 11 using the Euclidean division algorithm. For example, let \( y \) be the inverse of 2 modulo 11.
Then \(2y = 1 \pmod{11}\) implies \(2y = 11q + 1\) or \(1 = -11q + 2y\) for some integers \(y\) and \(q\). On dividing 11 by 2 as we would to show that \(\gcd(11, 2) = 1\), we find \(11 = 5 \cdot 2 + 1\) so that \(1 = 11 - 5 \cdot 2\), from which we see that \(q = -1\) and \(y = -5 \pmod{11}\) are solutions. Similarly, \(7^{-1} = 8 \pmod{11}\) since \(11 = 1 \cdot 7 + 4\) and \(7 = 1 \cdot 4 + 3\) and \(4 = 1 \cdot 3 + 1\), so \(1 = 4 - 1 \cdot 3 = 4 - 1 \cdot (7 - 1 \cdot 4) = 2 \cdot 4 - 1 \cdot 7 = 2 \cdot (11 - 1 \cdot 7) - 1 \cdot 7 = 2 \cdot 11 - 3 \cdot 7\). Thus \(-3 \cdot 7 = -2 \cdot 11 + 1\); that is, 7 and \(-3 = 8\) are inverses mod 11. The complete table of inverses modulo 11 is shown in Table 1.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(x)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(x^{-1})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2: Inverses modulo 11.

Suppose that we detect an error and we also know that it is the digit \(x_j\) that is in error (and hence unknown). Then we can use our table of inverses to solve for the value of \(x_j\), assuming all of the other digits are correct. Since

\[
jx_j + \sum_{k=1}^{10} kx_k = 0 \pmod{11},
\]

we know that

\[
x_j = -j^{-1}\sum_{k\neq j}^{10} kx_k \pmod{11}.
\]

For example, if we did not know the fourth digit \(x\) of the ISBN 0-19-x53803-0, we would calculate

\[
x = -4^{-1}(1 \cdot 0 + 2 \cdot 1 + 3 \cdot 9 + 5 \cdot 5 + 6 \cdot 3 + 7 \cdot 8 + 8 \cdot 0 + 9 \cdot 3 + 10 \cdot 0) \pmod{11}
\]

\[
= -3(0 + 2 + 5 + 3 + 7 + 1 + 0 + 5 + 0) \pmod{11} = -3(1) \pmod{11} = 8,
\]

which is indeed correct.

**Problem 1.5:** A smudge has obscured one of the digits of the ISBN code 0-8018-7391-9.

Determine the unknown digit.

The sixth digit is

\[
x_6 = -6^{-1}(1 \cdot 0 + 2 \cdot 8 + 3 \cdot 0 + 4 \cdot 1 + 5 \cdot 8 + 7 \cdot 7 + 8 \cdot 3 + 9 \cdot 9 + 10 \cdot 1) \pmod{11}
\]

\[
= -2(0 + 5 + 0 + 4 + 7 + 5 + 2 + 4 + 10) \pmod{11}
\]

\[
= -2(4) \pmod{11} = -8 \pmod{11} = 3.
\]
Problem 1.6: A smudge has obscured one of the digits of the ISBN code 0-393-05180-X. Determine the unknown digit.

The eighth digit is

\[ x_5 = -8^{-1}(1 \cdot 0 + 2 \cdot 3 + 3 \cdot 9 + 4 \cdot 3 + 5 \cdot 0 + 6 \cdot 5 + 7 \cdot 1 + 9 \cdot 0 + 10 \cdot 10) \pmod{11} \]
\[ = -7(0 + 6 + 5 + 1 + 0 + 8 + 7 + 0 + 1) \pmod{11} \]
\[ = -7(6) \pmod{11} = -9 \pmod{11} = 2. \]
Chapter 2

Linear Codes

An important class of codes are linear codes in the vector space $F_q^n$, where $F_q$ is a field.

**Definition:** A linear code $C$ is a code for which, whenever $u \in C$ and $v \in C$, then $\alpha u + \beta v \in C$ for all $\alpha, \beta \in F_q$. That is, $C$ is a linear subspace of $F_q^n$.

**Remark:** The zero vector $0$ automatically belongs to all linear codes.

**Remark:** A binary code $C$ is linear $\iff$ it contains $0$ and the sum of any two codewords in $C$ is also in $C$.

**Problem 2.1:** Show that the $(7, 16, 3)$ code developed in the previous chapter is linear.

**Remark:** A linear code $C$ will always be a $k$-dimensional linear subspace of $F_q^n$ for some integer $k$ between 1 and $n$. A $k$-dimensional code $C$ is simply the set of all linear combinations of $k$ linearly independent codewords, called *basis vectors*. We say that these $k$ basis codewords generate or span the entire code space $C$.

**Definition:** We say that a $k$-dimensional code in $F_q^n$ is an $[n, k]$ code, or if we also wish to specify the minimum distance $d$, an $[n, k, d]$ code.

**Remark:** Note that a $q$-ary $[n, k, d]$ code is an $(n, q^k, d)$ code. To see this, let the $k$ basis vectors of an $[n, k, d]$ code be $u_j$, for $j = 1, \ldots, k$. The $q^k$ codewords are obtained as the linear combinations $\sum_{j=1}^{k} a_j u_j$; there are $q$ possible values for each of the $k$ coefficients $a_j$. Note that

$$\sum_{j=1}^{k} a_j u_j = \sum_{j=1}^{k} b_j u_j \Rightarrow \sum_{j=1}^{k} (a_j - b_j) u_j = 0 \Rightarrow a_j = b_j, \quad j = 1, \ldots, k,$$

by the linear independence of the basis vectors, so the $q^k$ generated codewords are distinct.
Remark: Not every \((n, q^k, d)\) code is a \(q\)-ary \([n, k, d]\) code (it might not be linear).

Definition: Define the \textit{minimum weight} of a code to be \(w(C) = \min\{w(x) : x \in C, x \neq 0\}\).

One of the advantages of linear codes is illustrated by the following lemma.

Lemma 2.1 (Distance of a Linear Code): If \(C\) is a linear code in \(F_q^n\), then \(d(C) = w(C)\).

Proof: There exist codewords \(x, y,\) and \(z\) with \(x \neq y,\) and \(z \neq 0\) such that \(d(x, y) = d(C)\) and \(w(z) = w(C)\). Then

\[
d(C) \leq d(z, 0) = w(z - 0) = w(z) = w(C) \leq w(x - y) = d(x, y) = d(C),
\]

so \(w(C) = d(C)\).

Remark: Lemma 2.1 implies, for a linear code, that we only have to examine the weights of the \(M - 1\) nonzero codewords in order to find the minimum distance. In contrast, for a general nonlinear code, we need to make \(\binom{M}{2} = M(M - 1)/2\) comparisons (between all possible pairs of distinct codewords) to determine the minimum distance.

Definition: A \(k \times n\) matrix with rows that are basis vectors for a linear \([n, k]\) code \(C\) is called a \textit{generator matrix} of \(C\).

- A \(q\)-ary repetition code of length \(n\) is an \([n, 1, n]\) code with generator matrix \([1 1 \ldots 1]\).

Problem 2.2: Show that the \((7, 16, 3)\) perfect binary code in Chapter II is a \([7, 4, 3]\) linear code (note that \(2^4 = 16\)) with generator matrix

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 \\
a_1 \\
a_2 \\
a_3
\end{bmatrix}
= 
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]
**Remark:** Linear $q$-ary codes are not defined unless $q$ is a power of a prime (this is simply the requirement for the existence of the field $F_q$). However, lower-dimensional codes can always be obtained from linear $q$-ary codes by projection onto a lower-dimensional subspace of $F_q^n$. For example, the ISBN code is a subset of the 9-dimensional subspace of $F_{11}^{10}$ consisting of all vectors perpendicular to the vector $(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)$; this is the space

\[ \left\{ (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_{10}) : \sum_{k=1}^{10} kx_k = 0 \pmod{11} \right\}. \]

However, not all vectors in this set (for example X-00-000000-1) are in the ISBN code. That is, the ISBN code is not a linear code.

For linear codes we must slightly restrict our definition of equivalence so that the codes remain linear (e.g., in order that the zero vector remains in the code).

**Definition:** Two linear $q$-ary codes are *equivalent* if one can be obtained from the other by a combination of

(A) permutation of the columns of the code;

(B) multiplication of the symbols appearing in a fixed column by a nonzero scalar.

**Definition:** A $k \times n$ matrix of rank $k$ is in *reduced echelon form* (or *standard form*) if it can be written as

\[ [1_k \mid A], \]

where $1_k$ is the $k \times k$ identity matrix and $A$ is a $k \times (n-k)$ matrix.

**Remark:** A generator matrix for a vector space can always be reduced to an equivalent reduced echelon form spanning the same vector space, by permutation of its rows and columns, multiplication of a row by a non-zero scalar, or addition of one row to another. Note that any combination of these operations, including operation (B) above, will generate equivalent linear codes.

**Problem 2.3:** Show that the generator matrix for the $(7, 16, 3)$ perfect code in Chapter 1 can be written in reduced echelon form as

\[
G = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1
\end{bmatrix}.
\]
CHAPTER 2. LINEAR CODES

2.A Encoding and Decoding

A \([n, k]\) linear code \(C\) contains \(q^k\) codewords, corresponding to \(q^k\) distinct messages. We identify each message with a \(k\)-tuple

\[
u = [u_1 \ u_2 \ \ldots \ u_k],
\]

where the components \(u_i\) are elements of \(F_q\). We can encode \(u\) by multiplying it on the right with the generator matrix \(G\). This maps \(u\) to the linear combination \(uG\) of the codewords. In particular the message with components \(u_i = \delta_{ik}\) gets mapped to the codeword appearing in the \(k\)th row of \(G\).

- Given the message \([0, 1, 0, 1]\) and the above generator matrix for our \((7, 16, 3)\) code, the encoded codeword

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

is just the sum of the second and fourth rows of \(G\).

**Problem 2.4**: If a generator for a linear \([n, k]\) code is in standard form, show that the message vector is just the first \(k\) bits of the codeword.

**Definition**: Let \(C\) be a linear code over \(F_q^n\). Let \(a\) be any vector in \(F_q^n\). The set \(a + C = \{a + x : x \in C\}\) is called a coset of \(C\).

**Lemma 2.2** (Equivalent Cosets): Let \(C\) be a linear code in \(F_q^n\) and \(a \in F_q^n\). If \(b\) is an element of the coset \(a + C\), then

\[
b + C = a + C.
\]

Proof: Since \(b \in a + C\), then \(b = a + x\) for some \(x \in C\). Consider any vector \(b + y \in b + C\), with \(y \in C\). Then

\[
b + y = (a + x) + y = a + (x + y) \in a + C,
\]

so \(b + C \subseteq a + C\). Furthermore \(a = b + (-x) \in b + C\), so the same argument implies \(a + C \subseteq b + C\). Hence \(b + C = a + C\).

The following theorem from group theory states that \(F_q^n\) is just the union of \(q^{n-k}\) distinct cosets of a linear \([n, k]\) code \(C\), each containing \(q^k\) elements.

**Theorem 2.1** (Lagrange’s Theorem): Suppose \(C\) is an \([n, k]\) code in \(F_q^n\). Then

(i) every vector of \(F_q^n\) is in some coset of \(C\);
(ii) every coset contains exactly \( q^k \) vectors;

(iii) any two cosets are either equivalent or disjoint.

Proof:

(i) \( \mathbf{a} = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{0} \in \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{C} \) for every \( \mathbf{a} \in F_q^n \).

(ii) Since the mapping \( \phi(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{x} \) is one-to-one, \( |\mathbf{a} + \mathbf{C}| = |\mathbf{C}| = q^k \). Here \( |\mathbf{C}| \) denotes the number of elements in \( \mathbf{C} \).

(iii) Let \( \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in F_q^n \). Suppose that the cosets \( \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{C} \) and \( \mathbf{b} + \mathbf{C} \) have a common vector \( \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{b} + \mathbf{y} \), with \( \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbf{C} \). Then \( \mathbf{b} = \mathbf{a} + (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}) \in \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{C} \), so by Lemma 2.2 \( \mathbf{b} + \mathbf{C} = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{C} \).

**Definition**: The standard array (or Slepian) of a linear \([n, k]\) code \( \mathbf{C} \) in \( F_q^n \) is a \( q^{n-k} \times q^k \) array listing all the cosets of \( \mathbf{C} \). The first row consists of the codewords in \( \mathbf{C} \) themselves, listed with \( \mathbf{0} \) appearing in the first column. Subsequent rows are listed one at a time, beginning with a vector of minimal weight that has not already been listed in previous rows, such that the entry in the \((i, j)\)th position is the sum of the entries in position \((i, 1)\) and position \((1, j)\). The vectors in the first column of the array are referred to as coset leaders.

- Let us revisit our linear \((5, 4, 3)\) code

\[
\mathbf{C}_3 = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
\end{pmatrix}
\]

with generator matrix

\[
\mathbf{G}_3 = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

The standard array for \( \mathbf{C}_3 \) is a \( 8 \times 4 \) array of cosets listed here in three groups of increasing coset leader weight:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccc}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
\end{array}
\]
Remark: The last two rows of the standard array for $C_3$ could equally well have been written as

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccc}
1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
\end{array}
\]

Definition: If the codeword $x$ is sent, but the received vector is $y$, we define the error vector $e = y - x$.

Remark: If no more than $t$ errors have occurred, the coset leaders of weight $t$ or less are precisely the error vectors that can be corrected. Recall that the code $C_3$, having minimum distance 3, can only correct one error. For the code $C_3$, as long as no more than one error has occurred, the error vector will have weight at most one. We can then decode the received vector by checking to see under which codeword it appears in the standard array, remembering that the codewords themselves are listed in the first row. For example, if $y = 10111$ is received, we know that the error vector $e = 00001$, and the transmitted codeword must have been $x = y - e = 10111 - 00001 = 10110$.

Remark: If two errors have occurred, one cannot determine the original vector with certainty, because in each row with coset leader weight 2, there are actually two vectors of weight 2. For a code with minimum distance $2t + 1$, the rows in the standard array of coset leader weight greater than $t$ can be written in more than one way, as we have seen above. Thus, if 01110 is received, then either 01110 − 00011 = 01101 or 01110 − 11000 = 10110 could have been transmitted.

Remark: Let $C$ be a binary $[n, k]$ linear code and $\alpha_i$ denote the number of coset leaders for $C$ having weight $i$, where $i = 0, \ldots, n$. If $p$ is the error probability for a single bit, then the probability $P_{\text{corr}}(C)$ that a received vector is correctly decoded is

\[
P_{\text{corr}}(C) = \sum_{i=0}^{n} \alpha_i p^i (1 - p)^{n-i}.
\]

Remark: If $C$ can correct $t$ errors then the coset leaders of weight no more than $t$ are unique and hence the total number of such leaders of weight $i$ is $\alpha_i = \binom{n}{i}$ for $0 \leq i \leq t$. In particular, if $n = t$, then

\[
P_{\text{corr}}(C) = \sum_{i=0}^{n} \binom{n}{i} p^i (1 - p)^{n-i} = (p + 1 - p)^n = 1.
\]

Such a code is able to correct all possible errors (no matter how poor the transmission line is); however, since $C$ only contains a single codeword, it cannot be used to send any information!
Remark: For $i > t$, the coefficients $\alpha_i$ can be difficult to calculate. For a perfect code, however, we know that every vector is within a distance $t$ of some codeword. Thus, the error vectors that can be corrected by a perfect code are precisely those vectors of weight no more than $t$; consequently,

$$\alpha_i = \begin{cases} \binom{n}{i} & \text{for } 0 \leq i \leq t, \\ 0 & \text{for } i > t. \end{cases}$$

- For the code $C_3$, we see that $\alpha_0 = 1$, $\alpha_1 = 5$, $\alpha_2 = 2$, and $\alpha_3 = \alpha_4 = \alpha_5 = 0$. Hence

$$P_{\text{corr}}(C_3) = (1 - p)^5 + 5p(1 - p)^4 + 2p^2(1 - p)^3 = (1 - p)^3(1 + 3p - 2p^2).$$

For example, if $p = 0.01$, then $P_{\text{corr}} = 0.99921$ and $P_{\text{err}} \approx 1 - P_{\text{corr}} = 0.00079$, more than a factor 12 lower than the raw bit error probability $p$. Of course, this improvement in reliability comes at a price: we must now send $n = 5$ bits for every $k = 2$ information bits. The ratio $k/n$ is referred to as the rate of the code. It is interesting to compare the performance of $C_3$ with a code that sends two bits of information by using two back-to-back repetition codes each of length 5 and for which $\alpha_0 = 1$, $\alpha_1 = 5$, and $\alpha_2 = 10$. We find that $P_{\text{corr}}$ for such a code is

$$[(1 - p)^5 + 5p(1 - p)^4 + 10p^2(1 - p)^3]^2 = [(1 - p)^3(1 + 3p + 6p^2)]^2 = 0.99998$$

so that $P_{\text{err}} = 0.00002$. While this error rate is almost four times lower than that for $C_3$, bear in mind that the repetition scheme requires the transmission of twice as much data for the same number of information digits (i.e. it has half the rate of $C_3$).

2.B Syndrome Decoding

The standard array for our $(5, 4, 3)$ code had 32 entries; for a general code of length $n$, we will have to search through $2^n$ entries every time we wish to decode a received vector. For codes of any reasonable length, this is not practical. Fortunately, there is a more efficient alternative, which we now describe.

Definition: Let $C$ be a $[n, k]$ linear code. The dual code $C^\perp$ of $C$ in $F_q^n$ is the set of all vectors that are orthogonal to every codeword of $C$:

$$C^\perp = \{ v \in F_q^n : v \cdot u = 0, \forall u \in C \}.$$

Problem 2.5: Show that dual code $C^\perp$ to a linear code $C$ is itself linear.
Remark: The dual code $C^\perp$ is just the null space of $G$:

$$C^\perp = \{ u \in F_q^n : Gu^t = 0 \}.$$ 

That is,

$$v \in C^\perp \iff Gu^t = 0$$

(where the superscript $t$ denotes transposition). This just says that $v$ is orthogonal to each of the rows of $G$. From linear algebra, we know that the space spanned by the $k$ independent rows of $G$ is a $k$ dimensional subspace and the null space of $G$, which is just $C^\perp$, is an $n-k$ dimensional subspace.

Remark: Since every vector in $C$ is perpendicular to every vector in $C^\perp$, we know immediately that $C \subseteq (C^\perp)^\perp$. In fact, since the dimension of the linear supspace $(C^\perp)^\perp$ is $n-(n-k)=k$, we deduce that $C = (C^\perp)^\perp$.

Definition: Let $C$ be a $[n,k]$ linear code. An $(n-k) \times n$ generator matrix $H$ for $C^\perp$ is called a parity-check matrix.

Definition: The redundancy $r = n-k$ of a code represents the number of parity check digits in the code.

Remark: A code $C$ is completely specified by its parity-check matrix:

$$C = (C^\perp)^\perp = \{ u \in F_q^n : Hu^t = 0 \};$$

that is, $C$ is the space of all vectors that are orthogonal to every vector in $C^\perp$. In other words, $Hu^t = 0 \iff u \in C$.

Theorem 2.2 (Minimum Distance): A linear code has minimum distance $d \iff d$ is the maximum number such that any $d-1$ columns of its parity-check matrix are linearly independent.

Proof: Let $C$ be a linear code and $u$ be a codeword such that $w(u) = d(C) = d$. Since

$$u \in C \iff Hu^t = 0$$

and $u$ has $d$ nonzero components, we see that some $d$ columns of $H$ are linearly dependent. However, any $d-1$ columns of $H$ must be linearly independent, or else there would exist a nonzero codeword in $C$ with weight $d-1$.

Remark: Equivalently, a linear code has minimum distance $d$ if $d$ is the smallest number for which some $d$ columns of its parity-check matrix are linearly dependent.
For a code with weight 3, Theorem 2.2 tells us that any two columns of its parity-check matrix must be linearly independent, but that some 3 columns are linearly dependent.

**Definition:** Given a linear code with parity-check matrix $H$, the column vector $Hu^t$ is called the *syndrome* of $u$.

**Lemma 2.3:** Two vectors $u$ and $v$ are in the same coset of a linear code $C$ $\iff$ they have the same syndrome.

**Proof:**

$u - v \in C \iff H(u - v)^t = 0 \iff Hu^t = Hv^t$.

**Remark:** We thus see that there is a one-to-one correspondence between cosets and syndromes. This leads to an alternative decoding scheme known as *syndrome decoding*. When a vector $u$ is received, one computes the syndrome $Hu^t$ and compares it to the syndromes of the coset leaders. If the coset leader having the same syndrome is of minimal weight within its coset, it is the error vector for decoding $u$.

To compute the syndrome for a code, we need only first determine the parity check matrix. The following lemma describes an easy way to construct the standard form of the parity-check matrix from the standard-form generator matrix.

**Lemma 2.4:** An $(n - k) \times n$ parity-check matrix $H$ for an $[n, k]$ code generated by the matrix $G = [1_k \mid A]$, where $A$ is a $k \times (n - k)$ matrix, is given by

$$[ -A^t \mid 1_{n-k} ].$$

**Proof:** This follows from the fact that the rows of $G$ are orthogonal to every row of $H$, in other words, that

$$GH^t = [1_k \ A] \left[ \begin{array}{c} -A \\ 1_{n-k} \end{array} \right] = 1_k(-A) + (A)1_{n-k} = -A + A = 0,$$

the $k \times (n - k)$ zero matrix.

A parity-check matrix $H_3$ for our $(5, 4, 3)$ code is

$$H_3 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$
Problem 2.6: Show that the null space of a matrix is invariant to standard row reduction operations (permutation of rows, multiplication of a row by a non-zero scalar, and addition of one row to another) and that these operations may be used to put a matrix \( H \) of full rank into standard form.

Remark: The syndrome \( He^t \) of a binary error vector \( e \) is just the sum of those columns of \( H \) for which the corresponding entry in \( e \) is nonzero.

The following theorem makes it particularly easy to correct errors of unit weight. It will play a particularly important role for the Hamming codes discussed in the next chapter.

Theorem 2.3: The syndrome of a vector that has a single error of \( m \) in the \( i \)th position is \( m \) times the \( i \)th column of \( H \).

Proof: Let \( e_i \) be the vector with the value \( m \) in the \( i \)th position and zero in all other positions. If the codeword \( x \) is sent and the vector \( y = x + e_i \) is received the syndrome \( H y^t = H x^t + He_i^t = 0 + He_i^t = He_i^t \) is just \( m \) times the \( i \)th column of \( H \).

- For our \((5, 4, 3)\) code, if \( y = 10111 \) is received, we compute \( H y^t = 001 \), which matches the fifth column of \( H \). Thus, the fifth digit is in error (assuming that only a single error has occurred), and we decode \( y \) to the codeword 10110, just as we deduced earlier using the standard array.

Remark: If the syndrome does not match any of the columns of \( H \), we know that more than one error has occurred. We can still determine which coset the syndrome belongs to by comparing the computed syndrome with a table of syndromes of all coset leaders. If the corresponding coset leader has minimal weight within its coset, we are able to correct the error. To decode errors of weight greater than one we will need to construct a syndrome table, but this table, having only \( q^{n-k} \) entries, is smaller than the standard array, which has \( q^n \) entries.

Problem 2.7: Using the binary linear code with parity check matrix

\[
H = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0
\end{bmatrix},
\]

decode the received vector 1011.

The syndrome \([0, 0, 1]^t\) corresponds to the second column of \( H \). So the transmitted vector was \( 1011 - 0100 = 1111 \).
Problem 2.8: Consider the linear $[6, M, d]$ binary code $C$ generated by

$$G = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

(a) Find a parity check matrix $H$ for $C$.

First, we put $G$ in standard form:

$$G = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix},$$

from which we see that

$$H = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix},$$

(b) Determine the number of codewords $M$ and minimum distance $d$ of $C$. Justify your answers.

Since $G$ has 3 (linearly independent) rows, it spans a three-dimensional code space over $F_2$. Thus, $M = 2^3 = 8$. Since no two columns of $H$ are linearly dependent but the third column is the sum of the first two, we know by Theorem 2.2 that $d = 3$.

(c) How many errors can this code correct?

The code can correct only $\lfloor (d - 1)/2 \rfloor = 1$ error.

(d) Is $C$ a perfect code? Justify your answer.

No, because $8 \left( \binom{6}{0} + \binom{6}{1} \right) = 8(1 + 6) = 56 < 64 = 2^6$.

(e) Suppose the vector 011011 is received. Can this vector be decoded, assuming that only one error has occurred? If so, what was the transmitted vector?

The syndrome is $[110]^t$, which is the second column of $H$. So the transmitted vector was 001011.

(f) Suppose the vector 011010 is received. Can this vector be decoded, assuming that only one error has occurred? If so, what was the transmitted vector?

No, we cannot decode this vector because the syndrome is $[111]^t$, which is not a syndrome corresponding to an error vector of weight 1. At least 2 errors must have occurred and we cannot correct 2 errors with this code.

Problem 2.9:

(a) Let $C$ be a linear code. If $C = C^\perp$, prove that $n$ is even and $C$ must be an $[n, n/2]$ code.

Let $k$ be the dimension of the linear space $C$. The dimension of $C^\perp$ is $n - k$. If $C = C^\perp$, then $k = n - k$, so $n = 2k$. 
(b) Prove that exactly $2^{n-1}$ vectors in $F_2^n$ have even weight.

By specifying that a vector in $F_2^n$ has even weight, we are effectively imposing a parity check equation on it; the last bit is constrained to be the sum of the previous $n-1$ bits. So one can construct exactly $2^{n-1}$ vectors of even weight.

(c) If $C^\perp$ is the binary repetition code of length $n$, prove that $C$ is a binary code consisting of all even weight vectors. Hint: find a generator matrix for $C^\perp$.

The generator matrix for $C^\perp$ is the $1 \times n$ matrix

$$G^\perp = [1 \ 1 \ 1 \ \ldots \ 1 \ 1 \ 1].$$

This must be a parity check matrix for $C$, so we know that $C$ consists of all vectors $x_1x_2\ldots x_n$ for which $w(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i = 0$ (mod 2). That is, $C$ consists of all even weight vectors.

Alternatively, we can explicitly find a parity check matrix for $C^\perp$; namely, the $n-1 \times n$ matrix

$$H^\perp = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & \ldots & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\
1 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
\end{bmatrix}.$$  

We see that $H^\perp$ is a generator matrix for $C$ and that $C$ consists only of even weight vectors. Furthermore, the vector space $C$ has dimension $n-1$, so we know that it contains all $2^{n-1}$ even weight vectors.

**Problem 2.10:** Let $C$ be the code consisting of all vectors in $F_q^n$ with checksum $0 \mod q$. Let $C'$ be the $q$-ary repetition code of length $n$.

(a) Find a generator $G$ and parity-check matrix $H$ for $C$. What are the sizes of these matrices?

A generator for $C$ is the $(n-1) \times n$ matrix

$$G = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & -1 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & -1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & \ldots & 0 & -1 \\
\vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\
0 & 0 & \ldots & 1 & 0 & -1 \\
0 & 0 & \ldots & 1 & -1 \\
\end{bmatrix}.$$  

A parity-check matrix for $C$ is the $1 \times n$ matrix

$$H = [1 \ 1 \ \ldots \ 1].$$

(b) Find a generator $G'$ and parity-check matrix $H'$ for $C'$.

A generator for $C'$ is the $1 \times n$ matrix $G' = H$. A parity-check matrix for $C'$ is the $(n-1) \times n$ matrix $H' = G$.  

2.B. SYNDROME DECODING

(c) Which of the following statements are correct? Circle all correct statements.

- $C' \subset C^\perp$
- $C' = C^\perp$
- $C' \supset C^\perp$
- Neither $C' \supset C^\perp$ nor $C' \subset C^\perp$ holds.
- $C' \cap C^\perp = \emptyset$

(d) Find $d(C)$. Justify your answer.

Any set containing just one column of the parity-check matrix $H$ of $C$ is linearly independent, but the first and second column (say) are not. From Theorem 2.2, we conclude that $d(C) = 2$.

(e) Find $d(C')$. Justify your answer.

Since each codeword of $C'$ differs from all of the others in all $n$ places, we see that $d(C') = n$.

(f) How many codewords are there in $C$?
Since $G$ has $n - 1$ rows, there are $q^{n-1}$ possible codewords.

(g) How many codewords are there in $C'$?
Since $G'$ has 1 row, there are $q$ possible codewords.

(h) Suppose $q = 2$ and $n$ is odd. Use part(g) to prove that

$$\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} \binom{n}{k} = 2^{n-1}.$$

A odd-length binary $(n, 2, n)$ code can correct correct $t = (n - 1)/2$ errors. Odd-length binary codes are (trivially) perfect: they satisfy the Hamming equality

$$2 \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} \binom{n}{k} = 2^n,$$

from which the desired result follows. (Equivalently, this is a consequence of the left-right symmetry of Pascal’s triangle.)

Problem 2.11: Consider the linear $[7, M, d]$ binary code $C$ generated by

$$G = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix},$$
(a) Find a parity check matrix $H$ for $C$.

First, we row reduce $G$ to standard form:

$$G = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1
\end{bmatrix},$$

from which we see that

$$H = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix},$$

(b) Determine the number of codewords $M$ in $C$. Justify your answer.

Since $G$ has 3 (linearly independent) rows, it spans a three-dimensional code space over $F_2$. Thus, $M = 2^3 = 8$.

(c) Find the maximum number $N$ such that any set of $N$ columns of $H$ are linearly independent. Justify your answer.

It is convenient to divide the columns into two groups of clearly linearly independent vectors: the first three columns (which are distinct and do not sum up to zero) and the last four columns. Each of the first three columns has weight 3, and therefore cannot be written as a sum of two of the last four columns. Any two of the first three columns differ in more than one place, and so their sum cannot equal any of the last four columns. Thus, no three columns of $H$ are linearly dependent. However, the sum of the first three columns is equal to the fifth column, so $N = 3$ is the maximum number of linearly independent columns.

(d) Determine the minimum distance $d$ of $C$.

From part (c) and Theorem 2.2 we know that $d = 4$.

(e) How many errors can $C$ correct?

The code can correct only $\lfloor (d - 1)/2 \rfloor = 1$ error.

(f) Is $C$ a perfect code? Justify your answer.

No, from Problem 1.4(b) we know that a code with even distance can never be perfect. Alternatively, we note that $8\left(\binom{3}{0} + \binom{3}{1}\right) = 8(1 + 7) = 64 < 128 = 2^7$.

(g) By examining the inner (dot) products of the rows of $G$ with each other, determine which of the following statements are correct (circle all correct statements and explain):

- $C \subseteq C^\perp$.
- $C = C^\perp$.
- $C \supset C^\perp$.
- Neither $C \supset C^\perp$ nor $C \subseteq C^\perp$ holds.
- $C \cap C^\perp = \emptyset$. 
The only correct statement is \( C \subset C^\perp \), since the rows of \( G \) are orthogonal to each other. Note that \( C \) cannot be self-dual because it has dimension \( k = 3 \) and \( C^\perp \) has dimension \( n - k = 7 - 3 = 4 \).

(h) Suppose the vector 1100011 is received. Can this vector be decoded, assuming that no more than one error has occurred? If so, what was the transmitted codeword?

Yes, in fact this is the first row of \( G \), so it must be a codeword. So no errors have occurred; the transmitted codeword was 1100011. As a check, one can verify that the syndrome is \([0000]^t\).

(i) Suppose the vector 1010100 is received. Can this vector be decoded, assuming that no more than one error has occurred? If so, what was the transmitted codeword?

The syndrome is \([1101]^t\), which is the second column of \( H \). So the transmitted vector was 1110100.

(j) Suppose the vector 1111111 is received. Show that at least 3 errors have occurred. Can this vector be unambiguously decoded by \( C \)? If so what was the transmitted codeword? If not, and if only 3 errors have occurred, what are the possible codewords that could have been transmitted?

Since the syndrome \([1011]^t\) is neither a column of \( H \) nor the sum of two columns of \( H \), it does not correspond to an error vector of weight 1 or 2. Thus, at least 3 errors have occurred. We cannot unambiguously decode this vector because \( C \) can only correct 1 error. In fact, since the rows of \( G \) have weight 4, by part (g) and Problem 4.3, we know that all nonzero codewords in \( C \) have weight 4. So any nonzero codeword could have been transmitted, with 3 errors, to receive 1111111.

**Problem 2.12:** Consider a single error-correcting ternary code \( C \) with parity-check matrix
\[
H = \begin{bmatrix}
2 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 2 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

(a) Find a generator matrix \( G \).

A generator matrix is
\[
G = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

(b) Use \( G \) to encode the information messages 100, 010, 001, 200, 201, and 221. The information word \( x \) is encoded as \( xG \). So the information messages can be encoded as follows:
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 \\
2 & 0 & 0 \\
2 & 0 & 1 \\
2 & 2 & 1
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 0 & 1 \\
2 & 0 & 0 & 2 & 1 & 0 \\
2 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
2 & 2 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0
\end{bmatrix}.
\]
That is, the encoded words are the rows of the resulting matrix, namely 100120, 010011, 001201, 200210, 201111, and 221100.

(c) What is the minimum distance of this code?
Since
\[ 2H = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 2 & 2 & 0 & 0 \\ 2 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 2 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 2 \end{bmatrix}, \]
we see that the columns of \( H \) and \( 2H \) are distinct, so no two columns of \( H \) are linearly dependent. But the first column of \( H \) is the fifth column plus twice the fourth column, so by Theorem 2.2 we know that \( d = 3 \).

(d) Decode the received word 122112, if possible. If you can decode it, determine the corresponding message vector.
The syndrome is
\[
\begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \\ 2 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}.
\]
The syndrome 201 is twice the third column of \( H \), so the corrected word is 122112 – 2(00100) = 120112. Since \( G \) is in standard form, the corresponding message word, 120, is just the first three bits of the codeword.

(e) Decode the received word 102201, if possible. If you can decode it, determine the corresponding message vector.
The syndrome is
\[
\begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 2 \\ 2 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}.
\]
The syndrome 012 is not a multiple of any column of \( H \), so either an incorrect codeword was transmitted or more than one error in transmission has occurred. But you can only correct one error with this code, so you have to ask for a retransmission.
Chapter 3

Hamming Codes

One way to construct perfect binary \([n,k]\) codes that can correct single errors is to ensure that every nonzero vector in \(F_2^{n-k}\) appears as a unique column of \(H\). In this manner, the syndrome of every possible vector in \(F_2^n\) can be identified with a column of \(H\), so that every vector in \(F_2^n\) is at most a distance one away from a codeword. This is called a *binary Hamming code*, which we now discuss in the general space \(F_q^n\), where \(F_q\) is a field.

**Remark:** One can form \(q - 1\) distinct scalar multiples from any nonzero vector \(u\) in \(F_q^n\): if \(\lambda, \gamma \in F_q\), then
\[
\lambda u = \gamma u \Rightarrow (\lambda - \gamma)u = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda = \gamma \text{ or } u = (\lambda - \gamma)^{-1}0 = 0.
\]

**Definition:** Given an integer \(r \geq 2\), let \(n = (q^r - 1)/(q - 1)\). The *Hamming code* \(\text{Ham}(r,q)\) is a linear \([n,n-r]\) code in \(F_q^n\) for which the columns of the \(r \times n\) parity-check matrix \(H\) are the \(n\) distinct non-zero vectors of \(F_q^n\) with first nonzero entry equal to 1.

**Remark:** Not only are the columns of \(H\) distinct, all nonzero multiples of any two columns are also distinct. That is, any two columns of \(H\) are linearly independent. The total number of nonzero column multiples that can thus be formed is \(n(q-1) = q^r - 1\). Including the zero vector, we see that \(H\) yields a total of \(q^r\) distinct syndromes, corresponding to all possible error vectors of unit weight in \(F_q^n\).

- The columns of a parity-check matrix for the binary Hamming code \(\text{Ham}(r,2)\) consist of all possible nonzero binary codewords of length \(r\).

**Remark:** The columns of a parity-check matrix \(H\) for a Hamming code may be written in any order. However, both the syndromes and codewords will depend on the order of the columns. If \(H\) is row reduced to standard form, the codewords will be unchanged. However, other equivalent \(\text{Ham}(4,2)\) codes obtained by rearranging columns of \(H\) will have rearranged codewords.
CHAPTER 3. HAMMING CODES

Problem 3.1: Given a parity-check matrix $H$ for a binary Hamming code, show that the standard form for $H$ (obtained by row reduction) is just a rearrangement of the columns of $H$.

Remark: The dimension $k$ of Ham($r, q$) is given by

$$n - r = \frac{q^r - 1}{q - 1} - r.$$

- A parity-check matrix for the one-dimensional code Ham(2, 2) is

$$\begin{bmatrix}
0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix},$$

which can row reduced to standard form:

$$\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}.$$

The generator matrix is then seen to be $[1 \ 1 \ 1]$. That is, Ham(2, 2) is just the binary triple-repetition code.

- A parity-check matrix for the one-dimensional code Ham(3, 2) in standard form, is

$$\begin{bmatrix}
0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}.$$

Problem 3.2: Show that this code is equivalent to the (7,16,3) perfect code in Chapter [1].

Remark: An equivalent way to construct the binary Hamming code Ham($r, 2$) is to consider all $n = 2^r - 1$ nonempty subsets of a set $S$ containing $r$ elements. Each of these subsets corresponds to a position of a code in $\mathbb{F}_2^n$. A codeword can then be thought of as just a collection of nonempty subsets of $S$. Any particular element $a$ of $S$ will appear in exactly half of all $2^r$ subsets (that is, in $2^{r-1}$ subsets) of $S$, so that an even number of the $2^r - 1$ nonempty subsets will contain $a$. This gives us a parity-check equation, which says that the sum of all digits corresponding to a subset containing $a$ must be 0 (mod 2). There will be a parity-check equation for each of the $r$ elements of $S$ corresponding to a row of the parity-check matrix $H$. That is, each column of $H$ corresponds to one of the subsets, with a 1 appearing in the $i$th position if the subset contains the $i$th element and 0 if it doesn’t.
• A parity check matrix for Ham(3, 2) can be constructed by considering all possible nonempty subsets of \{a, b, c\}, each of which corresponds to one of the bits of a codeword \(x = x_1x_2\ldots x_7\) in \(F_2^7\):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>a</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>a</th>
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<th>a</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
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<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x1</td>
<td>x2</td>
<td>x3</td>
<td>x4</td>
<td>x5</td>
<td>x6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given any four binary information digits \(x_1, x_2, x_3,\) and \(x_4\), there will be a unique codeword satisfying \(Hx = 0\); the parity-check digits \(x_5, x_6,\) and \(x_7\) can be determined from the three checksum equations corresponding to each of the elements \(a, b,\) and \(c:\)

\[
\begin{align*}
  a &: \quad x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + x_5 = 0 \pmod{2}, \\
  b &: \quad x_1 + x_3 + x_4 + x_6 = 0 \pmod{2}, \\
  c &: \quad x_1 + x_2 + x_4 + x_7 = 0 \pmod{2}.
\end{align*}
\]

For example, the vector \(x = 1100110\) corresponds to the collection

\[
\{\{b, c\}, \{a, c\}, \{a\}, \{b\}\}.
\]

Since there are an even number of \(a\)'s, \(b\)'s, and \(c\)'s in this collection, we know that \(x\) is a codeword.

**Problem 3.3:** Show that two distinct codewords \(x\) and \(y\) that satisfy the above three parity check equations must differ in at least 3 places.

**Remark:** When constructing binary Hamming codes, there is a distinct advantage in arranging the parity-check matrix so that the columns, treated as binary numbers, are in ascending order. The syndrome, interpreted in exactly the same way as a binary number, immediately tells us in which position a single error has occurred.

• We can write a parity-check matrix for a Ham(3, 2) code in in the *binary ascending form*

\[
H = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

If the vector 1110110 is received, the syndrome is \([0, 1, 1]^t\), which corresponds to the binary number 3, so we know immediately that a single error must have occurred in the third position, without even looking at \(H\). Thus, the transmitted codeword was 1100110.
Remark: For nonbinary Hamming codes, we need to compare the computed syndrome with all nonzero multiples of the columns of the parity-check matrix.

- A parity-check matrix for Ham(2, 3) is

\[
H = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 2
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

If the vector 2020, which has syndrome \([2, 1]^t = 2[1, 2]^t\), is received and at most a single digit is in error, we see that an error of 2 has occurred in the last position and decode the vector as \(x = y - e = 2020 - 0002 = 2021\).

- A parity-check matrix for Ham(3, 3) is

\[
H = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 2 & 2 \\
1 & 2 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 0
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

If the vector 2000 0000 00001 is sent and at most a single error has occurred, then from the syndrome \([1, 2, 1]^t\) we see that an error of 1 has occurred in the second-last position, so the transmitted vector was 2000 0000 00021.

The following theorem establishes that Hamming codes can always correct single errors, as we saw in the above examples, and also that they are perfect.

**Theorem 3.1** (Hamming Codes are Perfect): Every Ham(r, q) code is perfect and has distance 3.

Proof: Since any two columns of \(H\) are linearly independent, we know from Theorem 2.2 that Ham(r, q) has a distance of at least 3, so it can correct single errors. The distance cannot be any greater than 3 because the nonzero columns

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
0 \\
\vdots \\
0 \\
1
\end{bmatrix}, \quad \begin{bmatrix}
0 \\
\vdots \\
0 \\
1
\end{bmatrix}, \quad \begin{bmatrix}
0 \\
\vdots \\
0 \\
1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

are linearly dependent.

Furthermore, we know that Ham(r, q) has \(M = q^k = q^{n-r}\) codewords, so the sphere-packing bound

\[
q^{n-r}(1 + n(q - 1)) = q^{n-r}(1 + q^r - 1) = q^n
\]

is perfectly achieved.

**Corollary 3.1.1** (Hamming Size): For any integer \(r \geq 2\), we have \(A_2(2^r - 1, 3) = 2^{2^r - 1 - r}\).
• Thus $A_2(3, 3) = 2$, $A_2(7, 3) = 16$, $A_2(15, 3) = 2^{11} = 2048$, and $A_2(31, 3) = 2^{26}$.

**Problem 3.4**: Determine the number $\alpha_i$ of coset leaders of weight $i$ for Ham($r$, $2$), for each $i = 0, \ldots, n$.

We know that the Hamming code is perfect and has minimum distance $3$. The error vectors that can be corrected by a Hamming code are precisely those vectors of weight one or less. These vectors fill $F_2^n$ completely, where $n = 2^r - 1$. Consequently, the coset weights are distributed according to

$$
\alpha_i = \begin{cases} 
\binom{n}{i} & \text{for } 0 \leq i \leq 1, \\
0 & \text{for } i > 1.
\end{cases}
$$

That is, $\alpha_0 = 1$, $\alpha_1 = n = 2^r - 1$, $\alpha_2 = \alpha_3 = \ldots = \alpha_n = 0$. Note that the total number of cosets is $\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 = 2^r = 2^{n-k}$ and each of them contain $2^k$ vectors, where $k = n - r$.

**Problem 3.5**: For all $r \in \mathbb{N}$, describe how to construct from Ham($r$, $2$) a code of length $n = 2^r$ with minimum distance $d = 4$ that contains $M = 2^{2^r-1-r}$ codewords. Prove that the minimum distance of your code is 4 and that $M$ is the maximum number of possible codewords for these parameters.

Extend the Hamming code Ham($r$, $2$), with length $n - 1 = 2^r - 1$, $M = 2^{n-r} = 2^{2^r-1-r}$, and distance 3 by adding a parity check to produce a code with $n = 2^r$ but still $M$ codewords. Since the parity check guarantees that the weight of all extended codewords is even, we know that the distance between any two of these codewords $x$ and $y$ is $w(x - y) = w(x) + w(y) - 2w(xy)$, which is even. Hence the minimum distance of the extended code, which is at least 3 and certainly no more than 4, must in fact be 4. We also know that the Hamming code is perfect. The extended Hamming code is not perfect, but we know by Corollary 1.3.1 that the maximum number of codewords for the parameters $(n, 4)$ is the same as the maximum number $M$ of codewords for the parameters $(n - 1, 3)$. 
Chapter 4

Golay Codes

We saw in the last chapter that the linear Hamming codes are nontrivial perfect codes.

Q. Are there any other nontrivial perfect codes?

A. Yes, two other linear perfect codes were found by Golay in 1949. In addition, several nonlinear perfect codes are known that have the same \(n, M,\) and \(d\) parameters as Hamming codes.

The condition for a code to be perfect is that its \(n, M,\) and \(d\) values satisfy the sphere-packing bound

\[
M \sum_{k=0}^{t} \binom{n}{k} (q - 1)^k = q^n,
\]  

(4.1)

with \(d = 2t + 1\). Golay found three other possible integer triples \((n, M, d)\) that do not correspond to the parameters of a Hamming or trivial perfect code. They are \((23, 2^{12}, 7)\) and \((90, 2^{78}, 5)\) for \(q = 2\) and \((11, 3^6, 5)\) for \(q = 3\). It turns out that there do indeed exist linear binary \([23, 12, 7]\) and ternary \([11, 6, 5]\) codes; these are known as Golay codes. But, as we shall soon, it is impossible for linear or nonlinear \((90, 2^{78}, 5)\) codes to exist.

**Problem 4.1:** Show that the \((n, M, d)\) triples \((23, 2^{12}, 7)\), \((90, 2^{78}, 5)\) for \(q = 2\), and \((11, 3^6, 5)\) for \(q = 3\) satisfy the sphere-packing bound \([1.1]\).

**Remark:** In view of Theorem \([1.3]\) a convenient way of finding a binary \([23, 12, 7]\) Golay code is to construct first the extended Golay \([24, 12, 8]\) code, which is just the \([23, 12, 7]\) Golay code augmented with a final parity check in the last position (such that the weight of every codeword is even).
The extended binary Golay \([24, 12, 8]\) code \(C_{24}\) can be generated by the matrix \(G_{24}\) defined by

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Remark: We can express \(G_{24} = [1_{12} | A]\), where \(A\) is a \(12 \times 12\) symmetric matrix; that is, \(A^t = A\).

**Problem 4.2:** Show that \(u \cdot v = 0\) for all rows \(u\) and \(v\) of \(G_{24}\). Hint: note that the first row of \(G\) is orthogonal to itself. Then establish that \(u \cdot v = 0\) when \(u\) is the second row and \(v\) is any row of \(G_{24}\). Then use the cyclic symmetry of the rows of the matrix \(A'\) formed by deleting the first column and first row of \(A\).

Remark: The above exercise establishes that the rows of \(G_{24}\) are orthogonal to each other. Noting that the weight of the rows of \(G_{24}\) is either 12 or 8, we make use of the following result.

**Definition:** A linear code \(C\) is **self-orthogonal** if \(C \subseteq C^\perp\). A linear code \(C\) is **self-dual** if \(C = C^\perp\).

**Problem 4.3:** Let \(C\) be a binary linear code with generator matrix \(G\). If each row of \(G\) is orthogonal to itself and all other rows and has weight divisible by 4, prove that \(C \subseteq C^\perp\) and that the weight of every codeword in \(C\) is a multiple of 4.

Remark: Since \(k = 12\) and \(n - k = 12\), the linear spaces \(C_{24}\) and \(C_{24}^\perp\) have the same dimension. Hence \(C_{24} \subseteq C_{24}^\perp\) implies \(C_{24} = C_{24}^\perp\). This means that the parity check matrix \(H_{24} = [A | 1_{12}]\) for \(C_{24}\) is also a generator matrix for \(C_{24}\)!

We are now ready to show that distance of \(C_{24}\) is 8 and, consequently, that the binary Golay \([23, 12]\) code generated by the first 23 columns of \(G_{24}\) must have minimum distance either 7 or 8. But since the third row of this reduced generator matrix is a codeword of weight 7, we can then be sure that the minimum distance is exactly 7.

Proof: We know that the weight of the code generated by $G_{24}$ must be divisible by 4. Since both $G_{24}$ and $H_{24}$ are generator matrices for the code, any codeword can be expressed either as a linear combination of the rows of $G_{24}$ or as a linear combination of the rows of $H_{24}$. We now show that a codeword $x \in C_{24}$ cannot have weight 4. It is not possible for all of the left-most twelve bits of $x$ to be 0 if $x$ is some nontrivial linear combination of the rows of $G_{24}$. Likewise, it is not possible for all of the right-most twelve symbols of $x$ to be 0 if $x$ is some nontrivial linear combination of the rows of $H_{24}$. If exactly one of the left-most (right-most) twelve bits of $x$ were 1, then $x$ would then be identical to a row of $G_{24}$ ($H_{24}$), none of which has weight 4. The only possible codeword of weight 4 is therefore a sum of two rows of $G_{24}$, but it is easily seen (again using the cyclic symmetry of $A'$) that no two rows of $G_{24}$ differ in only four positions. Since the weight of every codeword in $C_{24}$ must be a multiple of 4, we now know that $C_{24}$ must have a minimum distance of at least 8. In fact, since the second row of $G_{24}$ is a codeword of weight 8, we see that the minimum distance of $C_{24}$ is exactly 8.

Problem 4.4: Show that the ternary Golay [11, 6] code generated by the first 11 columns of the generator matrix

$$G_{12} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 2 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 2 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 2 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

has minimum distance 5.

Theorem 4.2 (Nonexistence of binary (90, 2^{78}, 5) codes): There exist no binary (90, 2^{78}, 5) codes.

Proof: Suppose that a binary (90, 2^{78}, 5) code $C$ exists. By Lemma 1.2 without loss of generality we may assume that $0 \in C$. Let $Y$ be the set of vectors in $F_2^{90}$ of weight 3 that begin with two 1s. Since there are 88 possible positions for the third one, $|Y| = 88$. From Eq. (1.1), we know that $C$ is perfect, with $d(C) = 5$. Thus each $y \in Y$ is within a distance 2 from a unique codeword $x$. But then from the triangle inequality

$$2 = d(C) - w(y) \leq w(x) - w(y) \leq w(x - y) \leq 2,$$

from which we see that $w(x) = 5$ and $d(x, y) = w(x - y) = 2$. This means that $x$ must have a 1 in every position that $y$ does.
Let $X$ be the set of all codewords of weight 5 that begin with two 1s. We know that for each $y \in Y$ there is a unique $x \in X$ such that $d(x, y) = 2$. That is, there are exactly $|Y| = 88$ elements in the set $\{(x, y) : x \in X, y \in Y, d(x, y) = 2\}$. But each $x \in X$ contains exactly three ones after the first two positions. Thus, for each $x \in X$ there are precisely three vectors $y \in Y$ such that $d(x, y) = 2$. That is, $3|X| = 88$.

This is a contradiction, since $|X|$ must be an integer.

Remark: In 1973, Tietävainen, based on work by Van Lint, proved that any non-trivial perfect code over the field $\mathbb{F}_q^n$ must either have the parameters $((q^r - 1)/(q - 1), q^{n-r}, 3)$ of a Hamming code, the parameters $(23, 2^{12}, 7)$ of the binary Golay code, or the parameters $(11, 3^6, 5)$ of the ternary Golay code.

Problem 4.5: Consider the extended ternary ($q = 3$) Golay $[12, 6, 6]$ code $C_{12}$ generated by

$$G_{12} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 2 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 2 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 2 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 2 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 2 & 1 & 0 
\end{bmatrix}$$

(a) Use the fact that $C_{12}$ is self-orthogonal ($C_{12} \subseteq C_{12}^\perp$) to find a parity-check matrix for $C_{12}$.

Since $n - k = 12 - 6 = 6 = k$, we know that the linear subspace $C_{12}^\perp$ and $C_{12}$ have the same dimension, so $C_{12} = C_{12}^\perp$. Hence, $G_{12}$ itself is a parity check matrix for $C_{12}$.

(b) Decode the received vector $y = 010 000 010 101$, assuming that at most two errors have occurred.

The syndrome of this vector is

$$\begin{bmatrix}
0 \\
1 \\
1 \\
1 \\
0
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
0 \\
0 \\
0 \\
0
\end{bmatrix} + 2 \begin{bmatrix}
0 \\
0 \\
0 \\
0
\end{bmatrix}.$$

Thus an error of 1 has occurred in position 7 and an error of 2 has occurred in position 6. That is, the error vector is $e = 000 002 100 000$, so the transmitted vector was $x = y - e = 010 001 210 101$. 
Chapter 5

Finite Fields

Until now we have always restricted our attention to the case where \( F_q \) is the set \( \mathbb{Z}_q = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, q-1\} \) for some prime number \( q \). In this chapter, we review the fact that \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) is a finite field if and only if \( q \) is prime. We then ask whether there exist finite fields of order \( q \) when \( q \) is not a prime number. We will conclude that there exist finite fields of order \( q \) if and only if \( q \) is an integral power \( p^r \) of some prime \( p \). Finally, we demonstrate that although general finite fields of order \( q = p^r \) may at first appear to be somewhat complicated, they all have a very simple underlying structure.

**Theorem 5.1** \((\mathbb{Z}_n)\): The ring \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) is a field \( \iff \) \( n \) is prime.

Proof:

“\( \Rightarrow \)” Let \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) be a field. If \( n = ab \), with \( 1 < a, b < n \), then \( b = a^{-1}ab = a^{-1}n = 0 \) (mod \( n \)), a contradiction. Hence \( n \) must be prime.

“\( \Leftarrow \)” Let \( n \) be prime. Since \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) has a unit and is commutative, we need only verify that each element \( a \neq 0 \) has an inverse. Consider the elements \( ia \), for \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, n-1 \). Each of these elements must be nonzero since neither \( i \) nor \( a \) is divisible by the prime number \( n \). These \( n-1 \) elements are distinct from each other since, for \( i, j \in 1, 2, \ldots, n-1 \),

\[
ia = ja \Rightarrow (i - j)a = 0 \text{ (mod } n) \Rightarrow n|(i - j)a \Rightarrow n|(i - j) \Rightarrow i = j.
\]

Thus, the \( n-1 \) elements \( a, 2a, \ldots, (n-1)a \) must be equal to the \( n-1 \) elements \( 1, 2, \ldots, n-1 \) in some order. One of them, say \( ia \), must be equal to 1. That is, \( a \) has inverse \( i \).

**Definition:** The order of a finite field \( F \) is the number of elements in \( F \).

**Theorem 5.2** (Subfield Isomorphic to \( \mathbb{Z}_p \)): Every finite field has the order of a power of a prime \( p \) and contains a subfield isomorphic to \( \mathbb{Z}_p \).
Proof: Let 1 (one) denote the (unique) multiplicative identity in \( F \), a field of order \( n \). The element 1 + 1 must be in \( F \), so label this element 2. Similarly 2 + 1 \( \in F \), which we label by 3. We continue in this manner until the first time we encounter an element \( k \) to which we have already assigned a label \( \ell \) (\( F \) is a finite field): the sum of \( k \) ones equals the sum of \( \ell \) ones, with \( k > \ell \). Hence the sum of \( p = k - \ell \) ones must be the additive identity, 0. If \( p \) is composite, \( p = ab \), then the product of the elements that we have labelled \( a \) and \( b \) would be 0, contradicting the fact that \( F \) is a field. Thus \( p \) must be prime and the set of numbers that we have labelled \( \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1\} \) is isomorphic to the field \( \mathbb{Z}_p \).

There must be at least one such subset having a maximal number of elements. Then, if \( x \) is any element of \( F \), the elements \( \{x, x_1, \ldots, x_r\} \) cannot be linearly independent, so that \( x \) can be written as a linear combination of \( \{x_1, \ldots, x_r\} \). Thus \( \{x_1, \ldots, x_r\} \) forms a basis for \( F \), so that the elements of \( F \) may be uniquely identified by all possible values of the coefficients \( a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_r \). Since there are \( p \) choices for each of the \( r \) coefficients, there are exactly \( p^r \) distinct elements in \( F \).

**Corollary 5.2.1** (Isomorphism to \( \mathbb{Z}_p \)): Any field \( F \) with prime order \( p \) is isomorphic to \( \mathbb{Z}_p \).

Proof: Theorem 5.2 says that the prime \( p \) must be the power of a prime, which can only be \( p \) itself. It also says that \( F \) contains \( \mathbb{Z}_p \). Since the order of \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) is already \( p \), there are no other elements in \( F \).

**Theorem 5.3** (Prime Power Fields): There exists a field \( F \) of order \( n \) \( \iff \) \( n \) is a power of a prime.

Proof:

“\( \Rightarrow \)” This is implied by Theorem 5.2

“\( \Leftarrow \)” Let \( p \) be prime and \( g \) be an irreducible polynomial of degree \( r \) in the polynomial ring \( \mathbb{Z}_p[x] \) (for a proof of the existence of such a polynomial, see \[\text{van Lint [1991]}\]). Recall that every polynomial can be written as a polynomial multiple of \( g \) plus a residue polynomial of degree less than \( r \). The field \( \mathbb{Z}_p[x]/g \), which is just the residue class polynomial ring \( \mathbb{Z}_p[x] \pmod{g} \), establishes the existence of a field with exactly \( p^r \) elements, corresponding to the \( p \) possible choices for each of the \( r \) coefficients of a polynomial of degree less than \( r \).
For example, we can construct a field with \(8 = 2^3\) elements using the polynomial \(g(x) = x^3 + x + 1\) in \(\mathbb{Z}_2[x]\). Note that \(g\) is irreducible: the fact that \(g(c) = c^3 + c + 1 \neq 0\) for all \(c \in \mathbb{Z}_2\), implies that \(g(x)\) cannot have a linear factor \((x - c)\).

Alternatively, we can establish the irreducibility of \(g\) in \(\mathbb{Z}_2[x]\) directly: If \(g(x) = (x^2 + Bx + C)(x + D) = x^3 + (B + D)x^2 + (C + BD)x + CD\), then

\[
CD = 1 \Rightarrow C = D = 1
\]

and hence

\[
C + BD = 1 \Rightarrow B = 0,
\]

which contradicts \(B + D = 0\).

That is, if \(a\) and \(b\) are two polynomials in \(\mathbb{Z}_2[x]/g\), their product can be zero \((\text{mod } g)\) only if one of them is itself zero. Thus, \(\mathbb{Z}_2[x]/g\) is a field with exactly \(2^3 = 8\) elements, corresponding to the 2 possible choices for each of the 3 polynomial coefficients.

**Definition:** The *Euler indicator* or *Euler totient* function

\[
\varphi(n) = \left| \{m \in \mathbb{N} : 1 \leq m \leq n, (m, n) = 1\} \right|
\]

is the number of positive integers less than or equal to \(n\) that are relatively prime (share no common factors).

- \(\varphi(p) = p - 1\) for any prime number \(p\).
- \(\varphi(p^r) = p^r - p^{r-1}\) for any prime number \(p\) and any \(r \in \mathbb{N}\) since \(p, 2p, 3p, \ldots, (p^{r-1} - 1)p\) all have a factor in common with \(p^r\).

**Remark:** If we denote the set of integers in \(\mathbb{Z}_n\) that are not zero divisors by \(\mathbb{Z}_n^*\), we see that \(\varphi(n) = |\mathbb{Z}_n^*|\).

- Here are the first 12 values of \(\varphi\):

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccccccc}
  x & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 \\
  \varphi(x) & 1 & 1 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 2 & 6 & 4 & 6 & 4 & 10 & 4 \\
\end{array}
\]

**Remark:** Note that

\[
\varphi(1) + \varphi(2) + \varphi(3) + \varphi(6) = 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 = 6,
\]

\[
\varphi(1) + \varphi(2) + \varphi(3) + \varphi(4) + \varphi(6) + \varphi(12) = 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 = 12,
\]

and \(\varphi(1) + \varphi(p) = 1 + (p - 1) = p\) for any prime \(p\).
Problem 5.1: The Chinese remainder theorem implies that \( \varphi(mn) = \varphi(m)\varphi(n) \) whenever \((m, n) = 1\). Use this result to prove for any \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) that
\[
\sum_{d \mid n} \varphi(d) = n.
\]

Problem 5.2: Consider the set
\[
S_n = \left\{ \frac{k}{n} : 1 \leq k \leq n \right\}.
\]

(a) How many distinct elements does \( S_n \) contain?

(b) If \( k \) and \( n \) have a common factor, reduce the fraction \( k/n \) to \( m/d \), where \( d \) divides \( n \) and \((m, d) = 1\), with \( 1 \leq m \leq d \). For each \( d \), express the number of possible values of \( m \) in terms of the Euler \( \varphi \) function.

(c) Obtain an alternative proof of the formula in Problem 5.1 from parts (a) and (b).

Definition: The order of a nonzero element \( \alpha \) of a finite field is the smallest natural number \( e \) such that \( \alpha^e = 1 \).

Theorem 5.4 (Primitive Element of a Field): The nonzero elements of any finite field can be written as powers of a single element.

Proof: Given a finite field \( F \) of order \( q \), let \( 1 \leq e \leq q - 1 \). Either there exists no elements in \( F \) of order \( e \) or there exists at least one element \( \alpha \) of order \( e \). In the latter case, \( \alpha \) is a root of the polynomial \( x^e - 1 \) in \( F[x] \); that is, \( \alpha^e = 1 \). Hence \( (\alpha^n)^e = (\alpha^e)^n = 1 \) for \( n = 0, 1, 2, \ldots \). Since \( \alpha \) has order \( e \), we know that each of the roots \( \alpha^n \) for \( n = 1, 2, \ldots, e \) are distinct. Since \( x^e - 1 \) can have at most \( e \) zeros in \( F[x] \), we then immediately know the factorization of the polynomial \( x^e - 1 \) in \( F[x] \):
\[
x^e - 1 = (x - 1)(x - \alpha)(x - \alpha^2) \ldots (x - \alpha^{e-1}).
\]

Thus, the only possible elements of order \( e \) in \( F \) are powers \( \alpha^i \) for \( 1 \leq i < e \). However, if \( i \) and \( e \) share a common factor \( n > 1 \), then \( (\alpha^i)^{e/n} = 1 \) and the order of \( \alpha^i \) would be less than or equal to \( e/n \). So this leaves only the elements \( \alpha^i \) where \( (i, e) = 1 \) as possible candidates for elements of order \( e \). Note that the \( e \) powers of \( \alpha \) are a subgroup (coset) of the multiplicative group \( G \) formed by the nonzero elements of \( F \), so Lagrange’s Theorem implies that \( e \) must divide the order of \( G \), that is, \( e \mid (q - 1) \).

Consequently, the number of elements of order \( e \), where \( e \) divides \( q - 1 \), is either 0 or \( \varphi(e) \). If the number of elements of order \( e \) were 0 for some divisor \( e \) of \( q - 1 \), then the total number of nonzero elements in \( F \) would be less than \( \sum_{e \mid (q-1)} \varphi(e) = q - 1 \), which is a contradiction. Hence, there exist elements in \( F \) of any order \( e \) that divides \( q - 1 \), including \( q - 1 \) itself. The distinct powers of an element of order \( q - 1 \) are just the \( q - 1 \) nonzero elements of \( F \).
**Definition:** An element of order \( q - 1 \) in a finite field \( F_q \) is called a *primitive element*.

**Remark:** Theorem 5.4 states that the elements of a finite field \( F_q \) can be listed in terms of a primitive element, say \( \alpha \):

\[
F_q = \{ 0, \alpha^0, \alpha^1, \alpha^2, \ldots, \alpha^{q-2} \}.
\]

**Remark:** The fact that all elements in a field \( F_q \) can be expressed as powers of a primitive element can be exploited whenever we wish to multiply two elements together. We can compute the product \( \alpha^i \alpha^j \) simply by determining which element can be expressed as \( \alpha \) raised to the power \((i + j) \mod (q - 1)\), in exactly the same manner as one uses a table of logarithms to multiply real numbers.

**Remark:** A primitive element of a finite field \( F_{p^r} \) need not be unique. In fact, we see from the proof of Theorem 5.4 that the number of such elements is \( \varphi(p^r - 1) \).

Specifically, if \( \alpha \) is a primitive element, then the powers \( \alpha^i \), for the \( \varphi(p^r - 1) \) values of \( i \) that are relatively prime to \( p^r - 1 \), are also primitive elements.

**Remark:** A primitive element \( \alpha \) of \( F_q \) satisfies the equation \( \alpha^{q-1} = 1 \), so that \( \alpha^q = \alpha \), and has the highest possible order \((q - 1)\). Note that \((\alpha^i)^{-1} = \alpha^{q-1-i}\).

**Problem 5.3:** Show that every nonzero element \( \beta \) of a finite field satisfies \( \beta^{q-1} = 1 \) in \( F_q \).

**Remark:** If \( \alpha \) is a primitive element of \( F_q \), then \( \alpha^{-1} = \alpha^{q-2} \) is also a primitive element of \( F_q \) since \((q - 2)(q - 1 - i) = i \mod(q - 1)\).

The fact that a primitive element \( \alpha \) satisfies \( \alpha^q = \alpha \) leads to the following corollary of Theorem 5.4.

**Corollary 5.4.1** (Cyclic Nature of Fields): Every element \( \beta \) of a finite field of order \( q \) is a root of the equation \( \beta^{q-1} = 0 \).

**Remark:** In particular, Corollary 5.4.1 states that every element \( \beta \) in a finite field \( F_{p^r} \) is a root of some polynomial \( f(x) \in F_p[x] \).

**Definition:** Given an element \( \beta \) in a field \( F_{p^r} \), the monic polynomial \( m(x) \) in \( F_p[x] \) of least degree with \( \beta \) as a root is called the *minimal polynomial* of \( \beta \).

**Theorem 5.5** (Minimal Polynomial): Let \( \beta \in F_{p^r} \). If \( f(x) \in F_p[x] \) has \( \beta \) as a root, then \( f(x) \) is divisible by the minimal polynomial of \( \beta \).

**Proof:** Let \( m(x) \) be the minimal polynomial of \( \beta \). If \( f(\beta) = 0 \), then expressing \( f(x) = q(x)m(x) + r(x) \) with \( \deg r < \deg m \), we see that \( r(\beta) = 0 \). By the minimality of \( \deg m \), we see that \( r(x) \) is identically zero.

**Corollary 5.5.1** (Minimal Polynomials Divide \( x^q - x \)): The minimal polynomial of an element of a field \( F_q \) divides \( x^q - x \).
**Corollary 5.5.2** (Irreducibility of Minimal Polynomial): Let \( m(x) \) be a monic polynomial in \( F_{p}[x] \) that has \( \beta \) as a root. Then \( m(x) \) is the minimal polynomial of \( \beta \) \( \iff \) \( m(x) \) is irreducible in \( F_{p}[x] \).

Proof:

“\( \Rightarrow \)” If \( m(x) = a(x)b(x) \), where \( a \) and \( b \) are of smaller degree, then \( a(\beta)b(\beta) = 0 \) implies that \( a(\beta) = 0 \) or \( b(\beta) = 0 \); this would contradict the minimality of \( \deg m \). Thus \( m(x) \) is irreducible.

“\( \Leftarrow \)” Since \( m(\beta) = 0 \), we know from Theorem 5.5 that \( m(x) \) is divisible by the minimal polynomial of \( \beta \). But since \( m(x) \) is irreducible and monic, the minimal polynomial must be \( m(x) \) itself.

**Definition:** A primitive polynomial of a field is the minimal polynomial of a primitive element of the field.

Q. How do we find the minimal polynomial of an element \( \alpha^{i} \) in the field \( F_{p^{r}} \)?

A. The following theorems provide some assistance.

**Theorem 5.6** (Functions of Powers): If \( f(x) \in F_{p}[x] \), then \( f(x^{p}) = [f(x)]^{p} \).

Proof: Exercise.

**Corollary 5.6.1** (Root Powers): If \( \alpha \) is a root of a polynomial \( f(x) \in F_{p}[x] \) then \( \alpha^{p} \) is also a root of \( f(x) \).

**Theorem 5.7** (Reciprocal Polynomials): In a finite field \( F_{p^{r}} \) the following statements hold:

(a) If \( \alpha \in F_{p^{r}} \) is a nonzero root of \( f(x) \in F_{p}[x] \), then \( \alpha^{-1} \) is a root of the reciprocal polynomial of \( f(x) \).

(b) A polynomial is irreducible \( \iff \) its reciprocal polynomial is irreducible.

(c) A polynomial is a minimal polynomial of a nonzero element \( \alpha \in F_{p^{r}} \Rightarrow \) a scalar multiple of its reciprocal polynomial is a minimal polynomial of \( \alpha^{-1} \).

(d) A polynomial is primitive \( \Rightarrow \) a scalar multiple of its reciprocal polynomial is primitive.

Proof: Exercise.

**Problem 5.4:** Show that the \( p \)th powers of distinct elements of a field \( F_{p^{r}} \) are distinct.
Problem 5.5: Show that the only elements \( a \) of \( F_{p^r} \) that satisfy the property that \( a^{p^r-1} = 1 \) in \( F_{p^r} \) are the \( p-1 \) nonzero elements of \( F_p \).

Suppose we want to find the minimal polynomial \( m(x) \) of \( \alpha^i \) in \( F_{p^r} \). Identify the set of distinct elements \( \{ \alpha^i, \alpha^{ip}, \alpha^{ip^2}, \ldots \} \). The powers of \( \alpha \) modulo \( p^r - 1 \) in this set form the cyclotomic coset of \( i \). Suppose there are \( s \) distinct elements in this set. By Corollary 5.6.1, each of these elements are distinct roots of \( m(x) \), and so the monic polynomial

\[
f(x) = \prod_{k=0}^{s-1} (x - \alpha^{ip^k})
\]

is certainly a factor of \( m(x) \).

Notice that the \( p \)th power of every root \( \alpha^{ip^k} \) of \( f(x) \) is another such root. The coefficients \( a_k \) in the expansion \( f(x) = \sum_{k=0}^{s} a_k x^k \) are symmetric functions of these roots, consisting of sums of products of the roots. When we raise these sums to the \( p \)th power we obtain symmetric sums of the \( p \)th powers of the products of the roots. Since the \( p \)th power of a root is another root and the coefficients \( a_k \) are invariant under root permutations, we deduce that \( a_k^p = a_k \). It follows that each of the coefficients \( a_k \) belong to the base field \( F_p \). That is, on expanding all of the factors of \( f(x) \), all of the \( \alpha \)s disappear! Hence \( f(x) \in F_p[x] \) and \( f(\alpha^i) = 0 \), so by Theorem 5.5 we know also that \( m(x) \) is a factor of \( f(x) \). Since \( f(x) \) is monic we conclude that \( m(x) = f(x) \).

Remark: Since the degree of the minimal polynomial \( m(x) \) of \( \alpha^i \) equals the number of elements \( s \) in the cyclotomic coset of \( \alpha^i \), we can sometimes use the previous theorems to help us quickly determine \( m(x) \) without having actually to perform the above product. Note that, since \( p^r = 1 \mod(p^r - 1) \), minimal polynomials in \( F_{p^r} \) have degree \( s \leq r \).

Problem 5.6: Show that the elements generated by powers belonging to a particular cyclotomic coset share the same minimal polynomial and order.

Remark: Every primitive polynomial of \( F_{p^r} \) has degree \( r \) and each of its roots is a primitive element of \( F_{p^r} \). This follows immediately from the distinctness of the elements \( \alpha, \alpha^p, \alpha^{p^2}, \ldots, \alpha^{p^{r-1}} \) for a primitive element \( \alpha \) of \( F_{p^r} \), noting that \( \alpha^{p^r} = \alpha \).

• We now find the minimal polynomial for each of the 16 elements of the field \( F_{2^4} = F_2[x]/(x^4 + x^3 + 1) \). It is straightforward to check that the polynomial \( x \) is a primitive element of the field (see Table 5.1). Since \( x \) is a root of the irreducible polynomial \( x^4 + x^3 + 1 \) in \( F_2[x]/(x^4 + x^3 + 1) \), we know from Corollary 5.5.2 that \( x^4 + x^3 + 1 \) is the minimal polynomial of \( x \) and hence is a primitive polynomial of \( F_{16} \). The cyclotomic cosets consist of powers \( i2^k \mod(15) \) of each element \( \alpha^i \):

\[
\{1, 2, 4, 8\},
\]
We see that these are just the elements corresponding to the second last coset.

The reciprocal polynomial of \( x^4 + x^3 + 1 \) is \( x^4 + x + 1 \); this is the minimal polynomial of the inverse elements \( \alpha^{-i} = \alpha^{15-i} \) for \( i = 1, 2, 4, 8 \), that is, for \( \alpha^{14}, \alpha^{13}, \alpha^{11}, \) and \( \alpha^7 \). We see that these are just the elements corresponding to the second last coset.

We can also easily find the minimal polynomial of \( \alpha^5, \alpha^6, \alpha^{12}, \) and \( \alpha^9 \). Since \( \alpha^{15} = 1 \), we observe that \( \alpha^3 \) satisfies the equation \( x^5 - 1 = 0 \). We can factorize \( x^5 - 1 = (x - 1)(x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1) \) and since \( \alpha^3 \neq 1 \), we know that \( \alpha^3 \) must be a root of the remaining factor, \( x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \). Furthermore, since the cyclotomic coset corresponding to \( \alpha^3 \) contains 4 elements, the minimal polynomial must have degree 4. So \( x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \) is in fact the minimal polynomial of \( \alpha^3, \alpha^6, \alpha^9 \), and \( \alpha^{12} \) (hence we have indirectly proven that \( x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \) is irreducible in \( F_2[x] \)).

Likewise, since the minimal polynomial of \( x^5 \) must be a factor of \( x^3 - 1 = (x - 1)(x^2 + x + 1) \) with degree 2, we see that the minimal polynomial for these elements is \( x^2 + x + 1 \).

Finally, the minimal polynomial of the multiplicative unit \( \alpha^0 = 1 \) is just the first degree polynomial \( x + 1 \). The minimal polynomial of 0 is \( x \).

These results are summarized in Table 5.1.

Remark: The cyclotomic cosets containing powers that are relatively prime to \( p^r - 1 \) contain the \( \varphi(p^r - 1) \) primitive elements of \( F_{p^r} \); their minimal polynomials are primitive and have degree \( r \). Note that \( x^4 + x^3 + 1 \) and \( x^4 + x + 1 \) are primitive polynomials of \( F_2[x]/(x^4 + x^3 + 1) \) and their roots comprise the \( \varphi(15) = \varphi(5)\varphi(3) = 4 \cdot 2 = 8 \) primitive elements of \( F_{p^r} \). Even though the minimal polynomial of the element \( \alpha^3 \) also has degree \( r = 4 \), it is not a primitive polynomial, since \( (\alpha^3)^5 = 1 \).

Remark: There is another interpretation of finite fields, as demonstrated by the following example. Consider the field \( F_4 = F_2[x]/(x^2 + x + 1) \), which contains the elements \{0,1,x,x+1\}. Since the primitive element \( \alpha = x \) satisfies the equation \( x^2 + x + 1 = 0 \), we could, using the quadratic formula, think of \( \alpha \) as the complex number

\[
\alpha = \frac{-1 + \sqrt{1 - 4}}{2} = -\frac{1}{2} + i\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2}.
\]

The other root to the equation \( x^2 + x + 1 = 0 \) is the complex conjugate \( \overline{\alpha} \) of \( \alpha \). That is, \( x^2 + x + 1 = (x - \alpha)(x - \overline{\alpha}) \). From this it follows that \( 1 = \alpha \overline{\alpha} = |\alpha|^2 \).
and hence $\alpha = e^{i\theta} = \cos \theta + i \sin \theta$ for some real number $\theta$. In fact, we see that $\theta = 2\pi/3$. Thus $\alpha^3 = e^{3\theta i} = e^{2\pi i} = 1$. In this way, we have constructed a number $\alpha$ that is a primitive third root of unity, which is precisely what we mean when we say that $\alpha$ is a primitive element of $F_4$. The field $F_4$ may be thought of either as the set $\{0, 1, x, x + 1\}$ or as the set $\{0, 1, e^{2\pi i/3}, e^{-2\pi i/3}\}$, as illustrated in Fig. 5.1. Similarly, the field $F_3 = \{0, 1, 2\}$ is isomorphic to $\{0, 1, -1\}$ and $F_5 = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4\}$ is isomorphic to $\{0, 1, i, -1, -i\}$.

![Figure 5.1: A representation of the field $F_4$ in the complex plane.](image-url)
Chapter 6
Cyclic Codes

Cyclic codes are an important class of linear codes for which the encoding and decoding can be efficiently implemented using shift registers. In the binary case, shift registers are built out of two-state storage elements known as flip-flops and arithmetic devices called binary adders that output the sum of their two binary inputs, modulo 2.

Many common linear codes, including Hamming and Golay codes, have an equivalent cyclic representation.

Definition: A linear code $C$ is cyclic if
\[ a_0a_1\ldots a_{n-1} \in C \Rightarrow a_{n-1}a_0a_1\ldots a_{n-2} \in C. \]

Remark: If $x$ is a codeword of a cyclic code $C$, then all cyclic shifts of $x$ also belong to $C$.

- The binary linear code $(000, 101, 011, 110)$ is cyclic.
- The $(7, 16, 3)$ perfect code in Chapter 1 which we now know is equivalent to Ham(3, 2), is cyclic.
- The binary linear code $(0000, 1001, 0110, 1111)$ is not cyclic. However, upon interchanging the third and fourth positions, we note that it is equivalent to the linear code $(0000, 1010, 0101, 1111)$, which is cyclic.

It is convenient to identify a codeword $a_0a_1\ldots a_{n-1}$ in a cyclic code $C$ with the polynomial
\[ c(x) = a_0 + a_1x + a_2x^2 + \ldots + a_{n-1}x^{n-1}. \]

Then $a_{n-1}a_0a_1\ldots a_{n-2}$ corresponds to the polynomial
\[ a_{n-1} + a_0x + a_1x^2 + \ldots + a_{n-2}x^{n-1} = xc(x) \pmod{x^n - 1}, \]
since \( x^n = 1 \pmod{x^n - 1} \). Thus, a linear code \( C \) is cyclic iff

\[
c(x) \in C \Rightarrow xc(x) \pmod{x^n - 1} \in C.
\]

That is, multiplication by \( x \) (modulo the polynomial \( x^n - 1 \)) corresponds to a cyclic shift.

**Definition:** The *polynomial ring* \( F_q[x] \) is the set of all polynomials \( P(x) \) with coefficients in \( F_q \).

**Definition:** The *residue class ring* \( R^n_q = F_q[x] / (x^n - 1) \) is the set of all polynomial remainders obtained by long division of polynomials in \( F_q[x] \) by \( x^n - 1 \). That is, \( R^n_q \) is the set of all polynomials of degree less than \( n \).

**Remark:** A cyclic code in \( F^n_q \) can be thought of as a particular subset of the residue class polynomial ring \( R^n_q \). In fact, the following theorem shows that a cyclic code \( C \) is an ideal of \( R^n_q \).

**Theorem 6.1 (Cyclic Codes are Ideals):** A linear code \( C \) in \( R^n_q \) is cyclic \( \iff \)

\[
c(x) \in C, r(x) \in R^n_q \Rightarrow r(x)c(x) \in C.
\]

**Proof:** Suppose \( C \) is a cyclic code in \( R^n_q \). We know that multiplication of a codeword \( c(x) \) in \( C \) by \( x \) corresponds to a cyclic shift of its coefficients, and since \( C \) is linear, we know that \( c(x) \in C \Rightarrow \alpha c(x) \in C \) for all \( \alpha \in F_q \). We thus see by induction that

\[
c(x) \in C \Rightarrow r(x)c(x) \in C \quad \forall r(x) \in R^n_q,
\]

where the multiplication is performed modulo \( x^n - 1 \). Conversely, suppose that \( C \) satisfies Eq. \([6.1]\). Taking \( r(x) = x \) shows that \( C \) is cyclic.

**Definition:** The *principal ideal*

\[
\langle g(x) \rangle = \{r(x)g(x) : r(x) \in R^n_q\}
\]

of \( R^n_q \) is the cyclic code *generated* by the polynomial \( g(x) \).

**Problem 6.1:** Verify that \( \langle g(x) \rangle \) is an ideal.

**Remark:** The next theorem states that every ideal in \( R^n_q \) is a principal ideal (i.e. \( R^n_q \) is a Principal Ideal Domain).
**Definition**: A polynomial is *monic* if its highest-degree coefficient is 1.

**Theorem 6.2** (Generator Polynomial): Let $C$ be a nonzero $q$-ary cyclic code in $R_q^n$. Then

(i) there exists a unique monic polynomial $g(x)$ of smallest degree in $C$;
(ii) $C = \langle g(x) \rangle$;
(iii) $g(x)$ is a factor of $x^n - 1$ in $F_q[x]$.

Proof:

(i) If $g(x)$ and $h(x)$ are both monic polynomials in $C$ of smallest degree, then $g(x) - h(x)$ is a polynomial in $C$ of smaller degree. If $g(x) - h(x) \neq 0$, a certain scalar multiple of $g(x) - h(x)$ would be a monic polynomial in $C$ of degree smaller than $\deg g$, which is a contradiction. Hence $g(x) = h(x)$.

(ii) Theorem 6.1 shows that $\langle g(x) \rangle \subset C$, so it only remains to show that $C \subset \langle g(x) \rangle$. Suppose $c(x) \in C$. Using long division, we can express $c(x) = q(x)g(x) + r(x)$, where $\deg r < \deg g$. But since $c(x)$ and $q(x)g(x)$ are both in the cyclic code $C$, we know by the linearity of $C$ that $r(x) = c(x) - q(x)g(x)$ is also in $C$. Hence $r(x) = 0$ (otherwise a scalar multiple of $r(x)$ would be a monic polynomial in $C$ of degree smaller than $\deg g$). That is, $c(x) \in \langle g(x) \rangle$.

(iii) By long division, we may express $x^n - 1 = q(x)g(x) + r(x)$, where $\deg r < \deg g$. But then $r(x) = -q(x)g(x) \pmod{x^n - 1}$ implies that $r(x) \in \langle g(x) \rangle$. By the minimality of $\deg g$, we see that $r(x) = 0$; that is, $x^n - 1$ is a multiple of $g(x)$.

**Definition**: The monic polynomial of least degree in Theorem 6.2 is called the *generator polynomial* of $C$.

**Theorem 6.3** (Lowest Generator Polynomial Coefficient): Let $g(x) = g_0 + g_1 x + \ldots + g_r x^r$ be the generator polynomial of a cyclic code. Then $g_0 \neq 0$.

Proof: Suppose $g_0 = 0$. Then $x^{n-1}g(x) = x^{-1}g(x)$ is a codeword of degree $r - 1$, contradicting the minimality of $\deg g$.

**Theorem 6.4** (Cyclic Generator Matrix): A cyclic code with generator polynomial

$$g(x) = g_0 + g_1 x + \ldots + g_r x^r$$

has dimension $n - r$ and generator matrix

$$G = \begin{bmatrix} g_0 & g_1 & g_2 & \ldots & g_r & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\ 0 & g_0 & g_1 & g_2 & \ldots & g_r & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & g_0 & g_1 & g_2 & \ldots & g_r & \ldots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & g_0 & g_1 & g_2 & \ldots & g_r \end{bmatrix}.$$
Proof: Let \( c(x) \) be a codeword in a cyclic code \( C \) with generator \( g(x) \). From Theorem 6.2, we know that
\[
c(x) = q(x)g(x)
\]
for some polynomial \( q(x) \). Note that \( \deg q < n - r \) since \( \deg c < n \). That is,
\[
c(x) = \left( q_0 + q_1 x + \ldots + q_{n-r-1} x^{n-r-1} \right) g(x) = q_0 g(x) + q_1 x g(x) + \ldots + q_{n-r-1} x^{n-r-1} g(x),
\]
which is a linear combination of the \( n - r \) rows \( g(x), xg(x), x^2 g(x), \ldots, x^{n-r-1} g(x) \) of \( G \). The diagonal of nonzero \( g_0 \)s next to a lower-triangular zero submatrix ensures that the rows of \( G \) are linearly independent. Thus, the span of the rows of \( G \) is the \( n - r \) dimensional code \( C \).

Remark: Together, Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 say that an \([n, k]\) code is cyclic \( \iff \) it is generated by a factor of \( x^n - 1 \). The following lemma is useful in finding these factors.

Lemma 6.1 (Linear Factors): A polynomial \( c(x) \) has a linear factor \( x - a \) \( \iff \) \( c(a) = 0 \).

Proof: Exercise.

Definition: A polynomial is said to be irreducible in \( F_q[x] \) if it cannot be factored into polynomials of smaller degree.

Lemma 6.2 (Irreducible 2nd or 3rd Degree Polynomials): A polynomial \( c(x) \) in \( F_q[x] \) of degree 2 or 3 is irreducible \( \iff \) \( c(a) \neq 0 \) for all \( a \in F_q \).

Proof: \( c(x) \) can be factored into polynomials of smaller degree \( \iff \) it has at least one linear factor \( (x - a) \) \( \iff \) \( c(a) = 0 \), by Lemma 6.1.

• Suppose we wish to find all ternary cyclic codes of length \( n = 4 \). The generators for such codes must be factors of \( x^4 - 1 \) in the ring \( F_3[x] \). Since 1 is a root of the equation \( x^4 - 1 \) we know that \( (x - 1) \) is a factor and hence
\[
(x^4 - 1) = (x - 1)(x^3 + x^2 + x + 1)
\]
By Lemma 6.2, the factor \( x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \) is not irreducible because it has a linear root at \( a = 2 = -1 \) in \( F_3 \). Using long division, we obtain
\[
(x^4 - 1) = (x - 1)(x + 1)(x^2 + 1).
\]
Since any combination of these three irreducible factors can be used to construct a generator polynomial \( g(x) \) for a cyclic code, there are a total of \( 2^3 = 8 \) ternary cyclic codes of length 4, as illustrated in Table 6.1. Upon examining the weights of the rows of the possible generator matrices, we see that the generated codes either have minimum distance less than or equal to 2 or else equal to 4. Hence, it is not possible to have a cyclic code of length 4 and minimum distance 3. In particular, \( \text{Ham}(2, 3) \), for which \( n = (3^2 - 1)/(3 - 1) = 4 \), cannot be cyclic. Thus, not all Hamming codes have a cyclic representation.
Table 6.1: Generator polynomial \( g(x) \) and corresponding generator matrix \( G \) for all possible ternary cyclic codes of length 4.
An easy way to find the parity check matrix for a cyclic \([n, k]\) code (without requiring that we first put \(G\) given by Theorem 6.4 in standard form) is to first construct the check polynomial \(h(x)\) of \(C\) from its generator polynomial \(g(x)\), where \(h(x)\) satisfies

\[ x^n - 1 = g(x)h(x) \]

in \(F_q[x]\). Since \(g\) is monic and has degree \(n - k\), we see that \(h\) is monic and has degree \(k\).

**Theorem 6.5** (Cyclic Check Polynomial): An element \(c(x)\) of \(R_q^n\) is a codeword of the cyclic code with check polynomial \(h \iff c(x)h(x) = 0\) in \(R_q^n\).

Proof:

"\(\Rightarrow\)" If \(c(x)\) is a codeword, then in \(R_q^n\) we have

\[ c(x) = a(x)g(x) \Rightarrow c(x)h(x) = a(x)g(x)h(x) = a(x)(x^n - 1) = a(x)0 (\text{mod } x^n - 1) = 0. \]

"\(\Leftarrow\)" We can express any polynomial \(c(x)\) in \(R_q^n\) as \(c(x) = q(x)g(x) + r(x)\) where \(\deg r < \deg g = n - k\). If \(c(x)h(x) = 0\) then

\[ r(x)h(x) = c(x)h(x) - q(x)g(x)h(x) = 0 (\text{mod } x^n - 1). \]

But \(\deg r(x)h(x) < n - k + k = n\), so \(r(x)h(x) = 0\) in \(F_q[x]\), not just in \(R_q^n\). If \(r(x) \neq 0\), consider its highest degree coefficient \(a \neq 0\). Then since \(h\) is monic, the coefficient of the highest degree term of the product \(r(x)h(x)\) is \(a = a \cdot 1 = 0\), which is a contradiction. Thus \(r(x) = 0\) and so \(c(x)\) is a codeword: \(c(x) = q(x)g(x) \in \langle g(x) \rangle\).

**Theorem 6.6** (Cyclic Parity Check Matrix): A cyclic code with check polynomial

\[ h(x) = h_0 + h_1x + \ldots + h_kx^k \]

has dimension \(k\) and parity check matrix

\[
H = \begin{bmatrix}
    h_k & h_{k-1} & h_{k-2} & \ldots & h_0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\
    0 & h_k & h_{k-1} & h_{k-2} & \ldots & h_0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\
    0 & 0 & h_k & h_{k-1} & h_{k-2} & \ldots & h_0 & \ldots & 0 \\
    \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\
    0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & h_k & h_{k-1} & h_{k-2} & \ldots & h_0
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

Proof: Since the degree of the generator polynomial \(g\) is \(r = n - k\), by Theorem 6.4, the dimension of the code must be \(k\). From Theorem 6.5 we know that a codeword \(c(x) = c_0 + c_1x + \ldots + c_{n-1}x^{n-1}\) must satisfy \(c(x)h(x) = 0\). In particular, the coefficients
of the product $c(x)h(x)$ must be zero; for $\ell = k, k+1, \ldots, n-1$ we then have
\[
0 = \sum_{i+j=\ell} c_i h_j.
\]
But then, since each of these equations is one of the $n-k$ rows of the matrix equation
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
h_k & h_{k-1} & h_{k-2} & \ldots & h_0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\
0 & h_k & h_{k-1} & h_{k-2} & \ldots & h_0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & h_k & h_{k-1} & h_{k-2} & \ldots & h_0
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
c_0 \\
c_1 \\
c_2 \\
\vdots \\
c_{n-1}
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
0 \\
0 \\
0 \\
\vdots \\
0
\end{bmatrix},
\]
the codewords are orthogonal to all cyclic shifts of the vector $h_k h_{k-1} h_{k-2} \ldots h_0 0 0 \ldots 0$. The codewords are thus orthogonal to all linear combinations of the rows of $H$. This means that $C^\perp$ contains the span of the rows of $H$. But $h_k = 1$, so we see that $H$ has rank $n-k$ and hence generates exactly the linear subspace $C^\perp$. That is, $H$ is a parity check matrix for the code with check polynomial $h(x)$.

**Definition:** The *reciprocal polynomial* $\overline{h}(x)$ of a polynomial
\[
h(x) = h_0 + h_1 x + \ldots + h_k x^k
\]
is obtained by reversing the order of its coefficients:
\[
\overline{h}(x) \triangleq x^k h(x^{-1}) = h_0 x^k + h_1 x^{k-1} + \ldots + h_k
\]

**Remark:** Since
\[
\overline{h}(x)\overline{g}(x) = \overline{h}(x)x^{n-k}g(x^{-1}) = x^n h(x^{-1})g(x^{-1}) = x^n ([x^{-1}]^n - 1) = 1 - x^n,
\]
we see that $\overline{h}(x)$ is a factor of $x^n - 1$. In view of Theorems 6.1, 6.2, and 6.6 this says that $C^\perp$ is itself a cyclic code, with (monic) generator $h_0^{-1}\overline{h}(x)$.

We are now able to show that all binary Hamming codes have an equivalent cyclic representation.

**Theorem 6.7** (Cyclic Binary Hamming Codes): The binary Hamming code $\text{Ham}(r, 2)$ is equivalent to a cyclic code.

**Proof:** Let $p(x)$ be an irreducible polynomial of degree $r$ in $F_2[x]$. By Theorem 5.3 $F_2[x]/p(x)$ is a field of order $2^r$, and by Theorem 5.4 we know that $F_2[x]/p(x)$ can be expressed as the set of distinct elements $\{0, \alpha^0, \alpha^1, \alpha^2, \ldots, \alpha^{2^n-2}\}$ for some primitive
element $\alpha$. We associate each element $a_0 + a_1x + a_2x^2 + \ldots + a_{r-1}x^{r-1} \in F_2[x]/p(x)$ with the column vector
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
a_0 \\
a_1 \\
\vdots \\
a_{r-1}
\end{bmatrix}
\]
Let $n = 2^r - 1$. The $r \times n$ matrix
\[
H = [1 \alpha \alpha^2 \ldots \alpha^{n-1}]
\]
is seen to be the parity check matrix for $C = \text{Ham}(r, 2)$ since its columns are precisely the distinct nonzero vectors of $F_2[x]/p(x)$. A codeword $c(x) = c_0 + c_1x + \ldots + c_{n-1}x^{n-1}$ in this code must then satisfy the vector equation $c_0 + c_1\alpha + c_1\alpha^2 + \ldots + c_{n-1}\alpha^{n-1} = 0$, so that
\[
C = \{c(x) \in R^n_2 : c(\alpha) = 0 \text{ in } F_2[x]/p(x)\}.
\]
If $c(x) \in C$ and $r(x) \in R^n_2$, we have $r(\alpha)c(\alpha) = r(\alpha)0 = 0$ in $F_2[x]/p(x)$, noting that $\alpha^n = 1$, so $r(x)c(x)$ is also an element of $C$. Theorem 6.1 then implies that $C$ is cyclic.

- The irreducible polynomial $x^3 + x + 1$ in $F_2[x]$ can be used to generate the field $F_8 = F_2[x]/(x^3 + x + 1)$ with $2^3 = 8$ elements. Note that $F_8$ has $x$ as a primitive element since all polynomials in $F_2[x]$ of degree less than 3 can be expressed as powers of $x$:

\[
F_8 = \{0, 1, x, x^2, x^3 = x + 1, x^4 = x^2 + x, x^5 = x^2 + x + 1, x^6 = x^2 + 1\}.
\]
Note that $x^7 = x^3 + x = 1$; that is, the primitive element has order $7 = 8 - 1$. The primitive element $x$ is a root of the primitive polynomial $x^3 + x + 1$ in $F_8$.

A parity check matrix for a cyclic version of the Hamming code Ham(3, 2) is thus
\[
H = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

Q. What is the generator polynomial for Ham($r, 2$)?

A. The close parallel between Theorem 6.2 and Theorem 5.5 when $n = p^r - 1$ gives us a clue: on comparing these results, we see from Theorem 6.4 that any minimal polynomial of a primitive element $\beta$ of $F_{p^r}$ is a generator polynomial for a cyclic code in $F_{p^r}$ (as we saw in Chapter 5, $\beta$ is a root of $x^n - 1 = 0$). In particular, the following corollary to Theorem 6.4 establishes that Ham($r, 2$) can be generated by any primitive polynomial of $F_{2^r}$, which is just a monic irreducible polynomial in $F_2[x]$ having a primitive element as a root.
Corollary 6.7.1 (Binary Hamming Generator Polynomials): Any primitive polynomial of $F_{2^r}$ is a generator polynomial for a cyclic Hamming code $\text{Ham}(r, 2)$.

Proof: Let $\alpha$ be a primitive element of $F_{2^r}$. Its minimal polynomial $p(x)$ is a primitive polynomial of $F_{2^r}$. From the proof of Theorem 6.7 we see that $\text{Ham}(r, 2)$ consists precisely of those polynomials $c(x)$ for which $c(\alpha) = 0$, for example, $p(x)$ itself. By Theorem 5.5 any such polynomial must be a multiple of $p(x)$. That is, $\text{Ham}(r, 2) \subset \langle p(x) \rangle$. Moreover, Theorem 6.4 implies that every multiple of the codeword $p(x)$ belongs to the cyclic code $\text{Ham}(r, 2)$. Hence $\text{Ham}(r, 2) = \langle p(x) \rangle$.

- Consider the irreducible polynomial $p(x) = x^3 + x + 1$ in $F_2[x]$. Since $x$ is a primitive element of $F_2[x]/p(x)$ and $p(x) = 0 \mod(x^3 + x + 1)$, we know that $p(x)$ is a primitive polynomial of $F_{2^3} = F_2[x]/p(x)$ and hence $\text{Ham}(3, 2) = \langle p(x) \rangle$. From Theorem 6.4 we can then immediately write down a generator matrix for a cyclic $\text{Ham}(3, 2)$ code:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]
Chapter 7

BCH Codes

For noisy transmission lines, Hamming codes are of limited use because they cannot correct more than one error. In this chapter, we discuss a class of important and widely used cyclic codes that can correct multiple errors, developed by R. C. Bose and D. K. Ray-Chaudhuri (1960) and independently by A. Hocquenghem (1959), known as Bose–Chaudhuri–Hocquenghem (BCH) codes.

Definition: Let $\alpha$ be an element of order $n$ in a finite field $F_{q^s}$. A BCH code of length $n$ and design distance $d$ is a cyclic code generated by the product of the distinct minimal polynomials in $F_{q^s}[x]$ of the elements $\alpha, \alpha^2, \ldots, \alpha^{d-1}$.

Remark: Often we take $\alpha$ to be a primitive element of $F_{q^s}$, so that $n = q^s - 1$. The resulting BCH code is known as a primitive BCH code. However, it is possible to construct BCH codes over $F_{q^s}$ of length $n$, where $n$ is any factor of $q^s - 1$.

Remark: We will establish that a BCH code of odd design distance $d$ has a minimum distance of at least $d$, by showing that such a code can correct $(d - 1)/2$ errors.

To encode the message word $a_0a_1\ldots a_{k-1}$, we represent it by the polynomial $f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} a_ix^i$ and form its product with the generator polynomial $g(x)$, to obtain the codeword $c(x) = f(x)g(x)$.

- For the primitive element $\alpha = x$ of the field $F_{2^4} = F_2[x]/(x^4 + x + 1)$, we can construct a $[15, 7]$ code that can correct two errors, by finding a generator polynomial $g(x)$ that has roots at $\alpha$, $\alpha^2$, $\alpha^3$, and $\alpha^4$. Such a generator can be created from the product of the minimal polynomials $m_1(x) = x^4 + x + 1$ of $\alpha$ and $m_3(x) = x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ of $\alpha^3$: $g(x) = m_1(x)m_3(x) = (x^4 + x + 1)(x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1) = x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^4 + 1$. In fact, $g(x)$ has even more roots than prescribed, namely at $\alpha$, $\alpha^2$, $\alpha^4$, $\alpha^8$, $\alpha^3$, $\alpha^6$, $\alpha^{12}$, and $\alpha^9$. Once we have shown that this code can correct two errors, we will know that its minimum distance is exactly 5 since the codeword $g(x)$ has weight 5.
Remark: In the binary case $q = 2$, the generator of a BCH code is just the product of the distinct minimal polynomials of the odd powers, from 1 to $d - 1$, of the primitive element.

Problem 7.1: Show that a polynomial $c(x)$ belongs to a BCH code with design distance $d \iff c(\alpha) = c(\alpha^2) = \ldots = c(\alpha^{d-1}) = 0$.

We now describe the decoding procedure for BCH codes. To keep the notation simple we begin by illustrating the procedure first for the binary case, where $q = 2$. Suppose that $y(x)$ is received rather than $c(x)$ and that $t$ errors have occurred. Then the error polynomial $e(x) = y(x) - c(x)$ can be written as $e(x) = x^{\ell_1} + x^{\ell_2} + \ldots + x^{\ell_t}$ for some unknown powers $\ell_1, \ell_2, \ldots, \ell_t$. We then compute the syndrome $S_1$ by substituting $\alpha$ into $y(x)$,

$$S_1 \doteq y(\alpha) = c(\alpha) + e(\alpha) = e(\alpha) = e_1 + \ldots + e_t,$$

where $e_i \equiv \alpha^{\ell_i}$ for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, t$. Likewise, we evaluate

$$S_2 \doteq y(\alpha^2) = c(\alpha^2) + e(\alpha^2) = e(\alpha^2) = e_1^2 + \ldots + e_t^2,$$

$$S_3 \doteq y(\alpha^3) = c(\alpha^3) + e(\alpha^3) = e(\alpha^3) = e_1^3 + \ldots + e_t^3,$$

$$S_{d-1} \doteq y(\alpha^{d-1}) = c(\alpha^{d-1}) + e(\alpha^{d-1}) = e(\alpha^{d-1}) = e_1^{d-1} + \ldots + e_t^{d-1}.$$

The decoding problem now amounts to determining if there is a value of $t$ and choices of field elements $e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_t$ consistent with the above equations. If a solution exists, from a table of the elements of $F_q^*$, one would then like to determine the corresponding powers $\ell_1, \ell_2, \ldots, \ell_t$ such that $e_i \equiv \alpha^{\ell_i}$. These powers tell us directly which bits we need to toggle. To find a possible solution to the above equations, the following definition will be helpful.

Definition: The error locator polynomial is

$$\sigma(x) \doteq (e_1x - 1)(e_2x - 1)\ldots(e_tx - 1) = b_t x^t + b_{t-1} x^{t-1} + \ldots + b_1 x + 1.$$

Notice that the roots of $\sigma(x)$ are just the inverses of $e_i$, $i = 1, 2, \ldots, t$.

To understand how the above syndrome equations are solved, it will be helpful to first discuss the case where $d = 5$ and $t \leq 2$ errors have occurred. We define $e_i = 0$ for $i > t$ and write

$$S_1 = e_1 + e_2,$$

$$S_2 = e_1^2 + e_2^2.$$
\[ S_3 = e_1^3 + e_2^3, \]
\[ S_4 = e_1^4 + e_2^4. \]

The error locator polynomial is \( \sigma(x) = b_2x^2 + b_1x + 1. \) Since \( \sigma(e_i^{-1}) = 0 \) for \( i = 1, 2 \) we know that
\[ 0 = e_1^3 \sigma(e_1^{-1}) = e_1^3(b_2e_1^{-2} + b_1e_1^{-1} + 1) = b_2e_1 + b_1e_1^2 + e_1^3 \]
and
\[ 0 = e_2^3 \sigma(e_2^{-1}) = b_2e_2 + b_1e_2^2 + e_2^3. \]
On adding these equations, we obtain
\[ 0 = b_2(e_1 + e_2) + b_1(e_1^2 + e_2^2) + (e_1^3 + e_2^3), \]
i.e.
\[ S_1b_2 + S_2b_1 = -S_3. \]
If for each \( i \) we had multiplied \( \sigma(e_i^{-1}) = 0 \) by \( e_i^4 \) instead of \( e_i^3 \) and added the resulting equations, we would have obtained
\[ S_2b_2 + S_3b_1 = -S_4. \]
To find \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \), we only need to solve the system of equations
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
S_1 & S_2 \\
S_2 & S_3
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
b_2 \\
b_1
\end{bmatrix}
= -
\begin{bmatrix}
S_3 \\
S_4
\end{bmatrix}
\tag{7.1}
\]
(Of course, in the binary case, the minus sign can be omitted.) If the coefficient matrix in Eq. (7.1) has rank 0, then \( S_1 = S_2 = S_3 = S_4 = 0 \) and hence \( e_1 + e_2 = 0 \), so that \( e_1 = e_2 \). This would imply that \( \ell_1 = \ell_2 \), in which case \( e(x) = 0 \); that is, no error has occurred. That is, the system of equations will have rank 0 \( \iff \) no errors have occurred.

Suppose that the coefficient matrix has rank 1. Since \( q = 2 \), we know that \( S_2 = S_1^2 \). Note that \( S_1 \neq 0 \), for otherwise the first equation would imply that \( S_3 = 0 \) and the rank of the coefficient matrix would be 0. Since the determinant \( S_1S_3 - S_2^2 = 0 \), we deduce \( S_3 = S_1^3 \). But
\[ e_1^3 + e_2^3 = (e_1 + e_2)^3 \Rightarrow 0 = 3e_1e_2(e_1 + e_2) = 3e_1e_2S_1. \]
This implies that \( e_2 = 0 \) (only one error has occurred) and that \( S_1 = e_1 = \alpha^\ell_1 \). Conversely, if only one error has occurred, then \( S_3 = S_1^3 \neq 0 \) and the coefficient matrix of Eq. (7.1) will have rank 1. Using a power table for \( F_2^4 \), we simply look up the exponent \( \ell_1 \) such that \( \alpha^x = S_1 \) and then toggle bit \( \ell_1 \) of \( y(x) \) to obtain the transmitted codeword \( c(x) \).

Finally, if the rank of the coefficient matrix is 2, we can solve for the coefficients \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \). If two errors have occurred, the error locator polynomial \( \sigma(x) = b_2x^2 + b_1x + 1 \) must have two roots in \( F_2^4 \), which we can determine by trial and error. The powers of \( \alpha \) associated with the inverses of these roots identify the two bit positions in which errors have occurred.
Let us demonstrate this decoding scheme for the \([15, 7]\) BCH code generated by the polynomial \(g(x) = x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^4 + 1\). Given the message word 110 0000, the transmitted codeword is 110 011 100 100 000, i.e. \(c(x) = (1 + x)g(x) = x^9 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x + 1\). Suppose that two errors have occurred, so that the received vector is 110 010 101 100 000, that is, \(y(x) = x^9 + x^8 + x^6 + x^4 + x + 1\).

Consulting the power table for \(F_2[x]/(x^4 + x + 1)\), we see that the syndromes are
\[
S_1 = y(\alpha) = \alpha^9 + \alpha^8 + \alpha^6 + \alpha^4 + \alpha + 1 = \alpha^3 + \alpha + 1 = \alpha^4,
\]
\[
S_2 = S_1^2 = \alpha^8,
\]
\[
S_3 = y(\alpha^3) = \alpha^{27} + \alpha^{24} + \alpha^{18} + \alpha^{12} + \alpha^3 + 1 = \alpha^4 + \alpha^3 + \alpha^2 + \alpha^1 + 1 = \alpha^7,
\]
\[
S_4 = S_2^2 = \alpha^{16} = \alpha.
\]
Since \(S_1 \neq 0\) and \(S_1S_3 - S_2^2 = S_1(S_3 - S_2^2) = S_1(\alpha^7 - \alpha^{12}) \neq 0\), the system of equations
\[
\begin{align*}
S_1 b_2 + S_2 b_1 &= S_3 \Rightarrow \alpha^4 b_2 + \alpha^8 b_1 = \alpha^7, \\
S_2 b_2 + S_3 b_1 &= S_4 \Rightarrow \alpha^8 b_2 + \alpha^7 b_1 = \alpha,
\end{align*}
\]
has rank 2. Upon adding \(\alpha^4\) times the first equation to the second equation, we see that
\[
(\alpha^{12} + \alpha^7)b_1 = \alpha^{11} + \alpha.
\]
Thus, \(b_1 = \alpha^{-2}\alpha^6 = \alpha^4\) and hence \(b_2 = \alpha^{-4}(\alpha^7 + \alpha^8\alpha^4) = \alpha^{-4}\alpha^2 = \alpha^{13}\). Thus, the error polynomial is
\[
\sigma(x) = \alpha^{13} x^2 + \alpha^4 x + 1 = (e_1 x - 1)(e_2 x - 1)
\]
We determine the roots of this equation by trial and error, That is, we search through the field until we find an \(i\) such that \(\alpha^{2i-2} + \alpha^{i+4} = 1\). Incrementing from \(i = 0\), the first such \(i\) we find is \(i = 7\), so one root is \(\alpha^7\). The inverse, say \(e_1\), of this root is \(\alpha^8\). Since the product \(e_1e_2 = b_2 = \alpha^{13}\), we immediately see that \(e_2 = \alpha^5\). That is, the two errors are in the fifth and eighth positions, so we decode the received vector 110 010 101 100 000 as the codeword 110 011 100 100 000. Upon division of the associated polynomial \(x^9 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x + 1\) by \(g(x) = x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^4 + 1\) we obtain \(x + 1\), which corresponds to the original message, 110 0000.

In the previous example, if instead the received vector was 110 010 100 100 000, that is, \(y(x) = x^9 + x^6 + x^4 + x + 1\), the syndromes would be
\[
S_1 = y(\alpha) = \alpha^9 + \alpha^6 + \alpha^4 + \alpha + 1 = \alpha^3 + \alpha + 1 = \alpha^5,
\]
\[
S_2 = S_1^2 = \alpha^{10},
\]
\[
S_3 = y(\alpha^3) = \alpha^{27} + \alpha^{18} + \alpha^{12} + \alpha^3 + 1 = \alpha^{12} + \alpha^3 + \alpha^{12} + \alpha^3 + 1 = 1,
\]
\[
S_4 = S_2^2 = \alpha^{20} = \alpha^5.
\]
Since $S_3 = S_1^3 \neq 0$, we know that only one error has occurred. In fact, $S_1 = \alpha^5$, so the error must be in the fifth position; one again we see that the transmitted codeword was 110 011 100 100 000.

In general, decoding requires that we solve the \textbf{nonlinear} system of $d-1$ syndrome equations

$$S_i = y(\alpha^i) = e_1^i + \ldots + e_t^i, \quad i = 1, \ldots, d-1 \quad (7.2)$$

for the value of $t$ and the errors $\{e_j : j = 1, \ldots, t\}$. Here $t \leq (d - 1)/2$ is the actual number of errors that have occurred, so that each of the values $e_j$ for $j = 1, \ldots, t$ are nonzero and distinct.

A straightforward generalization of the $t = 2$ decoding scheme leads to the $t$ equations:

$$0 = e_{i+1}^t \sigma(e_i^{-1}) = b_t e_i + b_{t-1} e_i^2 + \ldots + b_1 e_i^t + e_i^{t+1},$$

$$0 = e_i^{t+2} \sigma(e_i^{-1}) = b_t e_i^2 + b_{t-1} e_i^3 + \ldots + b_1 e_i^{t+1} + e_i^{t+2},$$

$$\ldots$$

$$0 = e_i^{2t} \sigma(e_i^{-1}) = b_t e_i^t + b_{t-1} e_i^{t+1} + \ldots + b_1 e_i^{2t-1} + e_i^{2t}.$$  

On summing each of these equations over $i$, we obtain a \textbf{linear} system of equations for the values $b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_t$ in terms of the $2t \leq d - 1$ syndromes $S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_{2t}$:

$$\begin{bmatrix}
S_1 & S_2 & \ldots & S_t \\
S_2 & S_3 & \ldots & S_{t+1} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
S_t & S_{t+1} & \ldots & S_{2t-1}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
b_t \\
b_{t-1} \\
\vdots \\
b_1
\end{bmatrix}
= 
\begin{bmatrix}
S_{t+1} \\
S_{t+2} \\
\vdots \\
S_{2t}
\end{bmatrix}. \quad (7.3)$$

\textbf{Problem 7.2}: Show that we may rewrite the coefficient matrix in Eq. \textbf{(7.3)} as

$$M = VDV^t,$$

where $V$ is the Vandermonde matrix

$$V = 
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & \ldots & 1 \\
e_1 & e_2 & \ldots & e_t \\
e_1^2 & e_2^2 & \ldots & e_t^2 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
e_1^{t-1} & e_2^{t-1} & \ldots & e_t^{t-1}
\end{bmatrix}$$

and $D = \text{diag}(e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_t)$ is a diagonal matrix with components $d_{ii} = e_i$. 
Remark: The matrix $D$ is nonsingular $\iff$ each of its eigenvalues $e_j$, $j = 1, \ldots, t$ are nonzero. Also, the following theorem establishes that the matrix $V$ is nonsingular $\iff$ the values $e_j$ are distinct.

**Theorem 7.1** (Vandermonde Determinants): For $t \geq 2$ the $t \times t$ Vandermonde matrix

$$
V = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & \ldots & 1 \\
e_1 & e_2 & \ldots & e_t \\
e_1^2 & e_2^2 & \ldots & e_t^2 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
e_1^{t-1} & e_2^{t-1} & \ldots & e_t^{t-1}
\end{bmatrix}
$$

has determinant $\prod_{i,j=1 \atop i \neq j}^t (e_i - e_j)$.

Proof: When $t = 2$ we see that $\det V = e_2 - e_1$. For $t > 2$, suppose that all $(t-1) \times (t-1)$ Vandermonde matrices have determinant

$$
\prod_{i,j=1 \atop i > j}^{t-1} (e_i - e_j) = \prod_{i=1}^{t-1} \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} (e_i - e_j).
$$

By subtracting $e_t$ times row $i - 1$ from row $i$, for $i = t, t-1, \ldots, 2$, we can rewrite the determinant of any $t \times t$ Vandermonde matrix as

$$
(-1)^{t-1} \begin{vmatrix}
1 & 1 & \ldots & 1 & 1 \\
e_1 - e_t & e_2 - e_t & \ldots & e_{t-1} - e_t & 0 \\
e_1(e_1 - e_t) & e_2(e_2 - e_t) & \ldots & e_{t-1}(e_{t-1} - e_t) & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\
e_1^{t-2}(e_1 - e_t) & e_2^{t-2}(e_2 - e_t) & \ldots & e_{t-1}^{t-2}(e_{t-1} - e_t) & 0
\end{vmatrix}
$$

$$
= (-1)^{t-1} \begin{vmatrix}
1 & 1 & \ldots & 1 \\
e_1(e_1 - e_t) & e_2(e_2 - e_t) & \ldots & e_{t-1}(e_{t-1} - e_t) \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
e_1^{t-2}(e_1 - e_t) & e_2^{t-2}(e_2 - e_t) & \ldots & e_{t-1}^{t-2}(e_{t-1} - e_t)
\end{vmatrix}
$$

$$
= \prod_{i=1}^{t-1} \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} (e_i - e_j) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{t-1} (e_t - e_i) = \prod_{i=1}^{t-1} \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} (e_i - e_j).
$$
Remark: We thus see that the matrix \( M = VDV^t \) is nonsingular \( \iff \) the error values \( e_j \) are nonzero and distinct.

Remark: If we attempt to increase the value of \( t \) in Eq. (7.2) beyond the actual number of errors that have occurred, either the values \( e_j \) will no longer be distinct or at least one of them will be zero. In either case, \( M \) will no longer be invertible. This gives us a method for finding the number of errors: \( t \) is just the largest number such that

\[
M = \begin{bmatrix}
S_1 & S_2 & \ldots & S_t \\
S_2 & S_3 & \ldots & S_{t+1} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
S_t & S_{t+1} & \ldots & S_{2t-1}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

is invertible.

Remark: If it is a priori known that no more than \( t \) errors have occurred in a received polynomial \( y \), then it is impossible for a \( (t + 1) \times (t + 1) \) or larger syndrome matrix based on \( y \) to be invertible.

Remark: Once we have determined the maximum value of \( t \) such that the coefficient matrix \( M \) is invertible, we simply solve the linear system Eq. (7.3) for the coefficients \( b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_t \) of the error locator polynomial \( \sigma(x) \). We can determine all \( t \) roots of \( \sigma(x) \) simply by searching through all of the field elements (at most one pass is required). The exponents \( \ell_1, \ell_2, \ldots, \ell_t \) corresponding to the inverses of these roots precisely identify the \( t \) positions of the received vector that are in error.

Remark: The above decoding procedure can be easily extended to nonbinary codes. In this case, the error vector becomes \( e(x) = q_1 x^{\ell_1} + q_2 x^{\ell_2} + \ldots + q_t x^{\ell_t} \), where each \( q_i \in F_q \), the syndromes become \( S_i = q_1 e_1^i + \ldots + q_t e_t^i \), and \( D = \text{diag}(q_1 e_1, q_2 e_2, \ldots, q_t e_t) \). We then see that any BCH code of design distance \( d \) can correct \( [(d - 1)/2] \) errors. We encapsulate this result in the following theorem.

Theorem 7.2 (BCH Bound): The minimum distance of a BCH code of odd design distance \( d \) is at least \( d \).

Proof: This follows from Theorem 1.1 and the fact that the BCH code can correct \( (d - 1)/2 \) errors.

Remark: Although Theorem 7.2 may be shown to hold also when the design distance \( d \) is even, we are normally interested only in the case of odd \( d \).

Remark: It may happen that the minimum distance of a BCH code exceeds its design distance \( d \), as illustrated by the following example.
• Let \( \alpha \) be a primitive element of \( F_{2^{11}} \). Since \( 2^{11} - 1 = 2047 = 23 \times 89 \), the element \( \beta = \alpha^{89} \) has order \( n = 23 \). The cyclotomic cosets mod 23 are \{0\}, \{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 9, 18, 13, 3, 6, 12\}, and \{5, 10, 20, 17, 11, 22, 21, 19, 15, 7, 14\}. Thus the minimal polynomials of \( m_1(x) \) of \( \beta \) and \( m_5(x) \) of \( \beta^5 \) in \( F_{2^{11}} \) each have degree 11.

We can then construct a \([23, 12]\) binary BCH code of length 23 from the degree 11 generator polynomial \( m_1(x) \), which has roots at \( \beta, \beta^2, \beta^3, \) and \( \beta^4 \). While the design distance of this code is 5, the actual minimum distance is 7; in fact, this BCH code is equivalent to the triple-error correcting \([23, 12, 7]\) Golay code we encountered in Chapter 4.

Remark: The special case of an \([n, k]\) BCH code for \( s = 1 \), where the primitive element \( \alpha \) comes from the same field \( F_q \) as the coefficients of the generator polynomial, is known as a Reed–Solomon code. Note that the minimal polynomial of any element of \( F_q \) has degree \( s = 1 \). The generator polynomial of a Reed–Solomon code of design distance \( d \),

\[
g(x) = (x - \alpha)(x - \alpha^2)(x - \alpha^3) \ldots (x - \alpha^{d-1}),
\]

thus has degree \( n - k = d - 1 \). That is, the minimum distance of the code must at least \( n - k + 1 \). But since there are \( \text{rk} H \leq n - k \) independent columns in the parity check matrix, we know from Theorem 2.2 that the minimum distance can be no more than \( n - k + 1 \). Thus, a Reed–Solomon code achieves the so-called singleton upper bound \( n - k + 1 \) for the minimum distance of a linear code. Because Reed–Solomon codes are optimal in this sense and easily implementable in hardware (using shift registers), they are widely used for error correction in computer memory chips, magnetic and optical (compact disk) storage systems, high-speed modems, and data transmission channels.

• Since 2 is a primitive element of \( \mathbb{Z}_{11} \), the polynomial

\[
g(x) = (x - 2)(x - 4)(x - 8)(x - 5)(x - 10)(x - 9) = x^6 + 6x^5 + 5x^4 + 7x^3 + 2x^2 + 8x + 2
\]

generates a triple-error correcting \([10, 4, 7]\) Reed–Solomon code over \( \mathbb{Z}_{11} \). One of the codewords is \( g(x) \) itself, which has weight 7, consistent with the above claim that the design distance of a Reed-Solomon code is in fact the actual minimum distance.

• Compact disk players use a double-error correcting \([255, 251, 5]\) Reed–Solomon code over \( F_{2^{56}} \) (the symbols are eight-bit bytes) with interleaving of the data over the disk to increase robustness to localized data loss.

---

\(^1\)Since \( \beta^{23} = 1 \), we know from Theorem 5.5 that \( x^{23} - 1 = (x - 1)m_1(x)m_5(x) \), moreover, Theorem 5.7 implies that \( m_5(x) = \overline{m}_1(x) \).
- High-performance computer memory chips containing so-called ECC SDRAM use Reed–Solomon codes to correct one error per 64-bit word in addition to detecting very rare multiple errors (which are programmed to generate a machine halt).

**Problem 7.3**: Prove that the Hamming code Ham(r, 2) is equivalent to an \([n, k]\) BCH code with distance \(d = 3\). What is the value of \(k\)?

Problem 7.3 establishes the hierarchy of error-correcting codes illustrated in Fig. 7.1.

![Hierarchy of Error-Correcting Codes](image)

**Problem 7.4**: In this question, we construct, from the primitive element \(\alpha = x\) in the field \(F_2[x]/(x^4 + x^3 + 1)\), a BCH code \(C\) of length \(n = 15\), design distance 7.

(a) Find the degree of the generator polynomial \(g(x)\) for \(C\).

We want \(\alpha, \alpha^2, \ldots, \alpha^6\) to be roots of \(g(x)\), so we want \(g(x) = m_1(x)m_3(x)m_5(x)\), which has degree \(4 + 4 + 2 = 10\). That is, \(n - k = 10\).

(b) What is the dimension \(k\) of \(C\)?

\[k = n - 10 = 5\]

(c) Is \(C\) perfect? Circle the correct answer: Yes / [No].

This code is not perfect since it has neither the parameters of a Hamming code nor a Golay code.

(d) Construct the generator polynomial \(g(x)\) for \(C\).

\[
g(x) = m_1(x)m_3(x)m_5(x) = (x^4 + x^3 + 1)(x^4 + x^5 + x^2 + x + 1)(x^2 + x + 1) = (x^8 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1)(x^2 + x + 1) = x^{10} + x^9 + x^8 + x^6 + x^5 + x^2 + 1.
\]
(e) We know that the minimum distance of \(C\) is at least the design distance 7. Using the fact that \(g(x)\) itself is a codeword of \(C\), prove that the actual minimum distance of \(C\) is exactly 7.

The weight of \(g(x)\) is 7, so the minimum distance of this linear code cannot exceed 7.

(f) Use the irreducible factors of \(x^{15} - 1\) (or any other means) to find the check polynomial \(h(x)\) of \(C\).

Since \(x^{16} - x = x(x + 1)m_1(x)m_3(x)m_5(x)m_7(x)\),
we know that
\[
x^{15} - 1 = (x + 1)m_1(x)m_3(x)m_5(x)m_7(x) = (x + 1)m_7(x)g(x).
\]
Hence \(h(x) = (x + 1)m_7(x) = (x + 1)(x^4 + x + 1) = x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1\).

(g) How many errors can \(C\) correct?

3

(h) Suppose the vector 011 111 101 110 111 is received. Without computing syndromes, find the transmitted codeword. How many errors have occurred?

Hint: Look for an obvious nearby codeword.

Since \(a^{15} = 1\) in \(F_{16}\), we see that
\[
1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha^3 + \ldots + \alpha^{15} = (\alpha - 1)^{-1}(\alpha^{15} - 1) = (\alpha - 1)^{-1} \cdot 0 = 0.
\]
That is, the vector consisting of 15 ones is a codeword. Our received vector is only a distance three away. Errors have occurred in positions 0, 7, and 11, but we can correct three errors. The transmitted codeword was thus 111 111 111 111 111.

(i) Determine the original transmitted message polynomial and the corresponding message.

The original message was
\[
1 + x + x^2 + x^3 + \ldots + x^{15} = (x + 1)^{-1}(x^{15} - 1).
\]
From part (f) we know that
\[
(x + 1)^{-1}(x^{15} - 1) = m_1(x)m_3(x)m_5(x)m_7(x) = m_7(x)g(x).
\]
Thus, the original message polynomial was \(m_7(x) = x^4 + x + 1\), corresponding to the message 11001.

**Problem 7.5**: (a) Show that \(x^2 + 1\) is irreducible in \(\mathbb{Z}_3[x]\).

Since \(x^2 + 1\) evaluates to 1, 2, 2 at the respective values 0, 1, 2 of \(\mathbb{Z}_3\), we know from Theorem 6.1 that it cannot have a linear factor. Since the degree of \(x^2 + 1\) is 2, it must be irreducible.
(b) Consider the field $F_9 = \mathbb{Z}_3[x]/(x^2 + 1)$. Show that the element $x$ is not a primitive element of this field. What is the order of $x$?

Since $x^2 = -1$, we see that $x^4 = 1$. The order $e$ must divide 8, so it is in fact 4. Since $4 < 8$, we know that $x$ is not a primitive element of this field.

(c) List all cyclotomic cosets (the distinct exponents in the sets $\{\alpha^i, \alpha^{3i}, \alpha^{3^2 i}, \ldots\}$, where $\alpha$ is a primitive element) of $F_9$.

\{0\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 6\}, \{4\}, \{5, 7\}.

(d) Establish that $\alpha = x + 1$ is a primitive element of the field $\mathbb{Z}_3[x]/(x^2 + 1)$ by completing the following table. Indicate the order and minimal polynomial of each element. Remember that the polynomial coefficients come from $\mathbb{Z}_3$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Polynomial</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Minimal Polynomial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^0$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$x + 2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^1$</td>
<td>$x + 1$</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$x^2 + x + 2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^2$</td>
<td>$2x$</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$x^2 + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^3$</td>
<td>$2x + 1$</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$x^2 + x + 2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^4$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$x + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^5$</td>
<td>$2x + 2$</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$x^2 + 2x + 2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^6$</td>
<td>$x$</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$x^2 + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^7$</td>
<td>$x + 2$</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$x^2 + 2x + 2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Problem 7.6: In the field $\mathbb{Z}_3[x]/(x^2 + 1)$, with primitive element $x + 1$, consider the BCH code $C$ of length $n = 8$ and design distance 5.

(a) Find the degrees of the minimal polynomials used to construct the generator polynomial $g$ of $C$ and the degree of $g$ itself.

Since we want $\alpha$, $\alpha^2$, $\alpha^3$, and $\alpha^4$ to be roots of $g(x)$, we know that $g$ must be the product of $m_1(x)$ (degree 2), $m_2(x)$ (degree 2), and $m_4$ (degree 1). Hence $g$ must have degree $2 + 2 + 1 = 5$. That is, $n - k = 5$.

(b) What is the dimension $k$ of $C$?

$k = n - 5 = 3$.

(c) How many codewords are there in $C$?

There are $3^k = 27$ codewords in $C$.

(d) Compute the syndromes $S_1$, $S_2$, and $S_3$ for the received polynomial $v(x) = x^3 + x^4 + 2x^5 + x^6$.

\begin{align*}
S_1 &= v(\alpha) = \alpha^3 + \alpha^4 + 2\alpha^5 + \alpha^6 = (2x + 1) + 2 + 2(2x + 2) + x = x + 1 = \alpha, \\
S_2 &= v(\alpha^2) = \alpha^6 + \alpha^8 + 2\alpha^{10} + \alpha^{12} = x + 1 + 2(2x) + 2 = 2x = \alpha^2, \\
S_3 &= v(\alpha^3) = S_1^3 = \alpha^3.
\end{align*}
(e) Using the value of the syndrome $S_1$ and the syndrome equation

$$\begin{bmatrix} S_1 & S_2 \\ S_2 & S_3 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_2 \\ b_1 \end{bmatrix} = -\begin{bmatrix} S_3 \\ S_4 \end{bmatrix},$$

show that the received polynomial in part (d) contains exactly one error.

Since $S_1 \neq 0$ but $S_1 S_3 - S_2^2 = \alpha \alpha^3 - (\alpha^2)^2 = 0$, we know that exactly one error has occurred.

(f) What was the transmitted polynomial in part (d)?

On solving

$$S_1 = \alpha = qe,$$
$$S_2 = \alpha^2 = qe^2,$$

we see that $e = \alpha$ and $q = 1$. So an error of 1 has appeared in the coefficient of $x$. On subtracting this error, we obtain the transmitted polynomial

$$2x + x^3 + x^4 + 2x^5 + x^6.$$

**Problem 7.7:** Consider the $[15, 7, 5]$ primitive BCH code $C$ over $F_{16}$. Let $\alpha$ be a primitive element of $F_{16}$.

(a) Find the degree of the generator polynomial $g$ for $C$.

$\deg g = n - k = 15 - 7 = 8$.

(b) Find the degrees of the minimal polynomials used to construct $g$.

The generator $g$ is constructed to have roots at $\alpha, \alpha^2, \alpha^3$, and $\alpha^4$. From the cyclotomic cosets

$$\{0\}, \quad \{1, 2, 4, 8\}, \quad \{3, 6, 12, 9\}, \quad \{5, 10\}, \quad \{7, 14, 13, 11\},$$

we see that it must include the minimal polynomials of $m_1(x)$ (degree 4) and $m_3(x)$ (degree 4). Since the sum of these degrees is $4 + 4 = 8$, we see that $g$ cannot contain any additional roots.

(c) Without computing syndromes, show that 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 is a codeword of $C$.

We know that the geometric series $c(x) = 1 + x^3 + x^6 + x^9 + x^{12}$ has the value $(1 + x^3)^{-1}[1 + (x^3)^5]$ for $x^3 \neq 1$. Then for $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$,

$$c(\alpha^i) = (1 + \alpha^{3i})^{-1}[1 + (\alpha^{3i})^5] = (1 + \alpha^{3i})^{-1}[1 + (\alpha^{15})^i]$$

$$= (1 + \alpha^{3i})^{-1}(1 + 1^i) = (1 + \alpha^{3i})^{-1}0 = 0$$

since $\alpha^{3i} \neq 1$. That is, $\alpha, \alpha^2, \alpha^3$, and $\alpha^4$ (but incidentally, not $\alpha^5$) are roots of $c(x)$. By Theorem 5.5, $c(x)$ is a multiple of the minimal polynomial of each of these elements, and therefore, of $g(x)$ itself. Thus $c(x)$ is in the code generated by $g(x)$.
Chapter 8

Cryptographic Codes

In contrast to error-correcting codes, which are designed only to increase the reliability of data communications, cryptographic codes are designed to increase their security. In cryptography, the sender uses a key to encrypt a message before it is sent through an insecure channel (such as a telephone line, radio transmission or the internet). An authorized receiver at the other end then uses a key to decrypt the received data to a message. Often, data compression algorithms and error-correcting codes are used in tandem with cryptographic codes to yield communications that are both efficient, robust to data transmission errors, and secure to eavesdropping and/or tampering. Typically, data compression is performed first; the resulting compressed data is then encrypted and finally encoded with an error-correcting scheme before being transmitted through the channel.

**Definition:** Let $\mathcal{K}$ be a set of cryptographic keys. A *cryptosystem* is a set
\[ \{e, d, \mathcal{E}_e, \mathcal{D}_d : e \in \mathcal{K}\} \]
of encrypting and decrypting keys, $e$ and $d$, and their associated encrypting function $\mathcal{E}_e$ and $\mathcal{D}_d$, respectively.

Most cryptosystems, or *ciphers*, fall into one of two broad classes: *symmetric-key cryptosystems*, where essentially the same key is used both to encrypt and decrypt a message (precisely, where $d$ can be easily determined whenever $e$ is known) and *public-key cryptosystems*, where the encryption key $e$ is made publicly available, but the decryption key $d$ is kept secret and is (hopefully) known only to the receiver.

8.A Symmetric-Key Cryptography

One of the simplest cryptographic systems is the *shift cipher* employed by Julius Caesar. Shift ciphers encode each symbol $m \in \{0, 1, \ldots, n - 1\}$ in the message as
\[ c = \mathcal{E}_e(m) = m + e \mod n, \]
where \( e \in \mathbb{N} \). Decoding is accomplished via the inverse transformation

\[
m = \mathcal{D}_d(c) = c + d \pmod{n},
\]

where \( d = -e \). That is, encoding is accomplished by addition modulo \( e \) and decoding is accomplished by subtraction modulo \( e \). Caeser adopted the value \( e = 3 \) to encrypt the \( n = 26 \) symbols of the Roman alphabet, using 0 to represent the letter A and 25 to represent the letter Z. Some fans of the film “2001: A Space Odyssey” even suggest that the computer name HAL is really a shift cipher for IBM, with \( e = 25! \).

A slight generalization of the shift cipher is the **affine cipher**, defined by

\[
c = \mathcal{E}_{a,b}(m) = am + b \pmod{n},
\]

where \( a \in \mathbb{N} \) is relatively prime to \( n \). This condition guarantees the existence of an inverse transformation,

\[
m = \mathcal{D}_{a,b}(c) = a^{-1}(c - b) \pmod{n}.
\]

Both shift and affine ciphers are very insecure since they are easily decoded simply by trying all possible values of \( a \) and \( b \)! They are both special cases of **simple substitution ciphers** or **monoalphabetic substitution ciphers**, which permute the alphabet symbols in a prescribed manner. Simple substitution ciphers can be cryptanalyzed (decoded by an unauthorized third party) by frequency analysis, in which the encrypted symbol frequencies are compared to those of the original message language to determine the applied permutation. **Block substitution ciphers** or **polyalphabetic substitution ciphers** divide the message into blocks of length \( r \) and apply different permutations to the symbols in individual positions of the block. Given enough encrypted text, block substitution ciphers are also easily cryptanalyzed once the block size \( r \) is determined, simply by doing a frequency analysis on the letters in each fixed position of all blocks.

**Digraph ciphers** map pairs of letters in the message text to encrypted pairs of letters. A general example of this is the **linear block or Hill cipher**, which uses an \( r \times r \) invertible matrix \( e \) to encrypt an entire block \( m \) of \( r \) message symbols:

\[
c = \mathcal{E}_e(m) = em \pmod{n},
\]

\[
m = \mathcal{D}_e(c) = e^{-1}c \pmod{n}.
\]

The existence of \( e^{-1} \) requires that \( \det e \) have an inverse in \( \mathbb{Z}_n \), which happens only when \( \gcd(\det e, n) = 1 \).

- Choose \( r = 2 \), \( n = 26 \) and

\[
e = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 1 \\ 3 & 4 \end{bmatrix}.
\]
We see that \( \det e = 5 \) has no common factors with 26. To find the inverse of 5 in \( \mathbb{Z}_{26} \) we use the Euclidean division algorithm: \( 1 = 5x + 26y, \quad 26 = 5 \cdot 5 + 1 \Rightarrow 1 = 26 - 5 \cdot 5 \), from which we see that \( x = -5 \) is a solution. Thus

\[
e^{-1} = -5 \begin{bmatrix} 4 & -1 \\ -3 & 2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 6 & 5 \\ 15 & 16 \end{bmatrix}.
\]

We can use \( e \) to encrypt the word “SECRET”, in other words the message 18 14 2 17 4 19, by breaking the message up into vectors of length two: [18, 4], [2, 17], [4, 19] and then multiplying the transpose of each vector by \( e \) on the left. The result is [14, 18], [21, 22], [10, 16], or the ciphertext “OSVWBK”. Note that the two letters “E” are not mapped to the same symbol in the ciphertext. For this reason the Hill cipher is less susceptible to frequency analysis (particularly for large block sizes; however, the number of entries in the key matrix then becomes unreasonably large).

**Problem 8.1**: Verify that the original message “SECRET” is recovered when “OSVWBK” is decoded with the matrix \( e^{-1} \).

A special case of the block cipher is the *permutation cipher*, in which the order of the characters in every block of text is rearranged in a prescribed manner. Permutation ciphers can be detected by frequency analysis since they preserve the frequency distribution of each symbol. In fact, all linear or affine block methods are subject to cryptanalysis using linear algebra, once \( r \) or \( r + 1 \) plaintext–ciphertext pairs are known.

A widely used commercial symmetric-key cryptosystem is the *Data Encryption Standard (DES)*, which is a type of *Feistel cipher* endorsed in 1977 by the United States National Bureau of Standards for the protection of confidential (but unclassified) government data. In 1981, DES was approved also for use in the private-sector. Feistel ciphers are block ciphers over \( \mathbb{F}_2^{2t} \). One divides a plaintext block message of \( 2t \) bits into two halves, \( L_0 \) and \( R_0 \), and then performs the iteration

\[
L_i = R_{i-1}, \\
R_i = L_{i-1} + f(R_{i-1}, e_i), \quad i = 1, \ldots, r;
\]

where the \( e_i \) are the keys and \( f \) is a specific nonlinear cipher function. The encryption function is \( E_e(L_0 \mid R_0) = R_r \mid L_r, \) where \( \mid \) denotes concatenation, and \( e = (e_1, \ldots, e_r) \) denotes a set of \( r \) encryption keys. The decryption function \( D_e(L_r \mid R_r) = R_0 \mid L_0, \) is implemented by applying the inverse iteration

\[
L_{i-1} = R_i + f(L_i, e_i), \\
R_{i-1} = L_i, \quad i = r, \ldots, 1.
\]

With Feistel ciphers, the encryption and decryption algorithms are essentially the same, except that the key sequence is reversed.
The DES cipher uses the half width $t = 32$ and $r = 16$ rounds of encryption. All 16 keys are generated from a bit sequence of length 64 that is divided into 8 bytes. The eighth bit of each byte is an (odd) parity check, so in fact there are only 56 information bits in the key. Hence the number of keys that need to be searched in a brute-force attack on DES is $2^{56}$. In fact, because of an inherent ones-complement symmetry, only $2^{55}$ keys need to be checked. On a modern supercomputer this is quite feasible; moreover, DES has recently been shown to be susceptible to relatively new cryptanalytic techniques, such as differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. Somewhat more secure variants of DES (such as Triple-DES, where DES is applied three times in succession with three different keys), were developed as interim solutions. One common application of DES that persists today is its use in encrypting computer passwords, using the password itself as a key. This is why many computer passwords are still restricted to a length of eight characters (64 bits).

In October 2000, the Rijndael Cryptosystem was adopted by the National Bureau of Standards as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to replace DES. It is based on a combinations of byte substitutions, shifts, and key additions, along with a diffusion-enhancing technique based on cyclic coding theory, where the data values are multiplied by the polynomial $3x^3 + x^2 + x + 2$ in the polynomial ring $F_{256}[x]/(x^4 - 1)$.

8.B Public-Key Cryptography

A principle difficulty with symmetric-key cryptosystems is the problem of key distribution and management. Somehow, both parties, which may be quite distant from each other, have to securely exchange their secret keys before they can begin communication.

One technique for avoiding the problem of key exchange makes use of two secure envelopes, or locks, which each party alternately applies and later removes from the sensitive data, as the data makes a total of three transits between sender and receiver. The required three transmissions makes this method awkward to use in practice.

In public-key cryptosystems, key exchange is avoided altogether by making copies of the receiver’s encrypting key (lock) available to anyone who wants to communicate with him. Both the secure envelope technique and the public-key technique require that the encrypting key $e$ is designed so that the decrypting key $d$ is extremely difficult to determine from knowledge of $e$. They also require authentication of the lock itself, to guard against so-called man-in-the-middle attacks.

8.B.1 RSA Cryptosystem

The most well known public-key cipher is the Rivest–Shamir–Aldeman (RSA) Cryptosystem. First, the receiver forms the product $n$ of two distinct large prime numbers $p$...
and \( q \) chosen at random, but such that \( p \) and \( q \) cannot be easily determined from \( n \).

The receiver then selects a random integer \( e \) between 1 and \( \varphi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) \) that is relatively prime to \( \varphi(n) \) and, using the Euclidean division algorithm, computes \( d = e^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(n)} \) (why does \( e^{-1} \) exist?). The numbers \( n \) and \( e \) are made publicly available, but \( d, p, q \) are kept secret.

Anyone who wishes to send a message \( m \), where \( 0 \leq m < n \), to the receiver encrypts the message using the encoding function

\[
c = \mathcal{E}_e(m) = m^e \pmod{n}
\]

and transmits \( c \). Because the receiver has knowledge of \( d \), the receiver can decrypt \( c \) using the decoding function

\[
M = \mathcal{D}_e(c) = c^d \pmod{n}.
\]

To show that \( M = m \), we will need the following results.

**Theorem 8.1** (Modified Fermat’s Little Theorem): If \( s \) is prime and \( a \) and \( m \) are natural numbers, then

\[
m[m^{a(s-1)} - 1] = 0 \pmod{s}.
\]

Proof: If \( m \) is a multiple of \( s \) we are done. Otherwise, we know that \( m^a \) is not a multiple of \( s \), so Fermat’s little theorem implies that \( (m^a)^{s-1} = 1 \pmod{s} \), from which the result follows.

**Corollary 8.1.1** (RSA Inversion): The RSA decoding function \( \mathcal{D}_e \) is the inverse of the RSA encoding function \( \mathcal{E}_e \).

By construction \( ed = 1 + k\varphi(n) \) for some integer \( k \), so

\[
M = \mathcal{D}_e(c) = c^d = (m^e)^d = m^{ed} = m^{1+k\varphi(n)} = m^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)} \pmod{n}.
\]

We first apply Theorem 8.1 with \( a = k(q - 1) \), \( s = p \) and then with \( a = k(p - 1) \), \( s = q \), to deduce that \( m[m^{k(q-1)(p-1)} - 1] \) is a multiple of both of the distinct primes \( p \) and \( q \), that is, \( m[m^{k(q-1)(p-1)} - 1] = 0 \pmod{pq} \). Thus

\[
M = mm^{k(q-1)(p-1)} = m \pmod{pq} = m \pmod{n}.
\]

---

1. For example, if \( p \) and \( q \) are close enough that \( (p + q)^2 - 4n = (p + q)^2 - 4pq = (p - q)^2 \) is small, then the sum \( p + q \) could be determined by searching for a small value of \( p - q \) such that \( (p - q)^2 + 4n \) is a perfect square, which must be \( p + q \). Knowledge of \( p - q \) and \( p + q \) is sufficient to determine both \( p \) and \( q \).

2. This follows from applying Theorem 5.4 to the field \( \mathbb{Z}_n \).
Let us encode the message “SECRET” (18 4 2 17 4 19) using the RSA scheme with a block size of 1. The receiver chooses \( p = 5 \) and \( q = 11 \), so that \( n = pq = 55 \) and \( \varphi(n) = 40 \). He then selects \( e = 17 \) and finds \( d = e^{-1} \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_{40} \), so that \( 17d = 40k + 1 \) for some \( k \in \mathbb{N} \). This amounts to finding \( \gcd(17, 40) \):

\[
40 = 2 \cdot 17 + 6, \quad 17 = 2 \cdot 6 + 5, \quad 6 = 1 \cdot 5 + 1,
\]
from which we see that

\[
1 = 6 - 5 = 6 - (17 - 2 \cdot 6) = 3 \cdot (40 - 2 \cdot 17) - 17 = 3 \cdot 40 - 7 \cdot 17.
\]

That is, \( d = -7 \pmod{40} = 33 \). The receiver publishes the numbers \( n = 55 \) and \( e = 17 \), but keeps the factors \( p = 5, q = 11, \) and \( d = 33 \) (and \( \varphi(n) \)) secret.

The sender then encodes 18 4 2 17 4 19 as

\[
18^{17} 4^{17} 2^{17} 17^{17} 4^{17} 19^{17} \pmod{55} = 28 49 7 52 49 24
\]

The two E's are encoded in exactly the same way, since the block size is 1: obviously, a larger block size should be used to thwart frequency analysis attacks.

The receiver would then decode the received message 28 49 7 52 49 24 as

\[
28^{33} 49^{33} 7^{33} 52^{33} 49^{33} 24^{33} \pmod{55} = 18 4 2 17 4 19.
\]

**Remark:** While the required exponentiations can be performed by repeated squaring and multiplication in \( \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(n)} \) (e.g. \( x^{33} = x^{32} \cdot x \)), RSA decryption can be implemented in a more efficient manner. This is important, since to make computing the secret key \( d \) (from knowledge of \( n \) and \( e \) alone) difficult, \( d \) must be chosen to be about as large as \( n \). Instead of computing \( m = c^d \) directly, we first find \( a = c^d \pmod{p} \) and \( b = c^d \pmod{q} \). This is very easy since Fermat’s little theorem says that \( c^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p} \), so these definitions reduce to

\[
a = c^d \mod(p-1) \pmod{p}, \quad b = c^d \mod(q-1) \pmod{q}.
\]

The Chinese remainder theorem then guarantees that the system of linear congruences

\[
m = a \pmod{p}, \quad m = b \pmod{q},
\]

has exactly one solution in \( \{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\} \). One can find this solution by using the Euclidean division algorithm to construct integers \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( 1 = xp + yq \). Since \( yq = 1 \pmod{p} \) and \( xp = 1 \pmod{q} \), we see that

\[
m = ayq + bxp \pmod{n}
\]

is the desired solution. Since the numbers \( x \) and \( y \) are independent of the ciphertext, the factors \( xp \) and \( yq \) can be precomputed.

---

\(^3\)For example, we could encode pairs of letters \( i \) and \( j \) as \( 26i + j \) and choose \( n \geq 26^2 = 676 \), although such a limited block size would still be vulnerable to more time consuming but feasible digraph frequency attacks.
To set up an efficient decoding scheme we precompute $x$ and $y$ such that $1 = px + qy$. For $p = 5$ and $q = 11$, we see that $x = -2$ and $y = 1$ are solutions, so that $xp = -10$ and $yq = 11$. Once $a$ and $b$ are determined from the ciphertext we can quickly compute $m = 11a - 10b \pmod{55}$. For example, to compute $28^{33}$ we evaluate

$$a = 28^{33} \pmod{4} \pmod{5} = 28 \pmod{5} = 3,$$

$$b = 28^{33} \pmod{10} \pmod{11} = 28^3 \pmod{11} = 6^3 \pmod{11} = 7$$

and then compute $m = 11a - 10b = (33 - 70) \pmod{55} = 18$.

Remark: Determining $d$ from $e$ and $n$ can be shown to be equivalent to determining the prime factors $p$ and $q$ of $n$. Since factoring large integers in general is an extremely difficult problem, the belief by many that RSA is a secure cryptographic system rests on this equivalence. However, it has not been ruled out that no other technique for decrypting RSA ciphertext exists. If such a technique exists, presumably it does not involve direct knowledge of $d$ (as that would constitute an efficient algorithm for factorizing integers!).

Problem 8.2: You have intercepted an encrypted transmission that was intended for your math professor. It consists of the three numbers 26, 14, and 19. Each of these numbers was separately encoded, using RSA encoding and a block size of 1, where the letters A to Z are mapped to $Z_{26}$ in the usual way. On your professor’s web page you notice that he lists his public key as $(n = 33, e = 13)$.

(a) Without breaking into your professor’s computer, determine the “secret” prime factors $p$ and $q$ of $n$.

$p = 3, q = 11$.

(b) Determine the decryption exponent $d$, knowing $e, p, q$.

First we find $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) = 20$. Since $20 = 1 \cdot 13 + 7, 13 = 1 \cdot 7 + 6, and 7 = 1 \cdot 6 + 1$, we see that $1 = 7 - 6 = 7 - (13 - 7) = 2 \cdot 7 - 13 = 2 \cdot (20 - 13) - 13 = 2 \cdot 20 - 3 \cdot 13$. So $d = -3 \pmod{20} = 17$.

(c) Use $d$ to decrypt the secret message. Interpret your result as a three-letter English word.

Since $11 = 3 \cdot 3 + 2$ and $3 = 1 \cdot 2 + 1$ we see that $1 = 3 - 2 = 3 - (11 - 3 \cdot 3) = 4 \cdot 3 - 11$. Hence $1 = xp + yq$, where $x = 4$ and $y = -1$. Hence we can decode the message $c$ as $m = 12b - 11a \pmod{33}$, where $a = c^{17} \pmod{3} = c^1 \pmod{3}$ and $b = c^{17} \pmod{11} = c^7 \pmod{11}$.

For $c = 26$, we find

$$a = 26^1 \pmod{3} = 2^1 \pmod{3} = 2,$$

$$b = 26^7 \pmod{11} = 4^7 \pmod{11} = 2^{14} \pmod{11} = 2^4 \pmod{11} = 5.$$ 

This yields $m = 12(5) - 11(2) = 38 \pmod{33} = 5$. 

Similarly, for $c = 14$, we find

\[
a = 2^1 \pmod{3} = 2,
\]

\[
b = 3^7 \pmod{11} = 3 \cdot 27^2 \pmod{11} = 3 \cdot 5^2 \pmod{11} = 3 \cdot 3 \pmod{11} = 9.
\]

This yields $m = 12(9) - 11(2) = 20$.

Finally, for $c = 19$, we find

\[
a = 1^{17} \pmod{3} = 1,
\]

\[
b = 8^7 \pmod{11} = 2^{21} \pmod{11} = 2^1 \pmod{11} = 2.
\]

This yields $m = 12(2) - 11(1) = 13$.

Thus, the sent message was 5, 20, 13, which spells FUN!

**Problem 8.3:** You have intercepted an encrypted transmission from the Prime Minister’s Office to the Leader of the Official Opposition. It consists of the two numbers 27 and 14, which were separately encoded, using RSA encoding and a block size of 1, where the letters A to Z are mapped to $\mathbb{Z}_{26}$ in the usual way. On the Leader of the Official Opposition’s web page you notice that he lists his public key as $(n = 35, e = 11)$.

(a) Determine the “secret” prime factors $p$ and $q$ of $n$.

$p = 5, q = 7$.

(b) Determine the decryption exponent $d$, knowing $e, p, and q$.

First we find $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) = 24$. Since $24 = 2 \cdot 11 + 2, 11 = 5 \cdot 2 + 1$, we see that $1 = 11 - 5 \cdot 2 = 11 - 5 \cdot (24 - 2 \cdot 11) = 11 \cdot 11 - 5 \cdot 24$. So $d = 11$.

(c) Use $d$ to decrypt the secret message. Interpret your result as a two-letter English word.

Since $7 = 1 \cdot 5 + 2$ and $5 = 2 \cdot 2 + 1$ we see that $1 = 5 - 2 \cdot 2 = 5 - 2 \cdot (7 - 1 \cdot 5) = 3 \cdot 5 - 2 \cdot 7$.

Hence $1 = xp + yq$, where $x = 3$ and $y = -2$. Hence we can decode the message $c$ as $m = 15b - 14a \pmod{35}$, where $a = c^{11} \pmod{5} = c^3 \pmod{5}$ and $b = c^{11} \pmod{7} = c^5 \pmod{7}$.

For $c = 27$, we find

\[
a = 27^3 \pmod{5} = 2^3 \pmod{5} = 3,
\]

\[
b = 27^5 \pmod{7} = (-1)^5 \pmod{7} = -1 \pmod{7} = 6.
\]

This yields $m = 15(6) - 14(3) = 48 \pmod{35} = 13$.

Similarly, for $c = 14$, we find

\[
a = 14^3 \pmod{5} = (-1)^3 \pmod{5} = 4,
\]

\[
b = 14^5 \pmod{7} = 0.
\]

This yields $m = -14(4) = -56 \pmod{35} = 14$.

Thus, the sent message was 13, 14 which spells NO!
8.B.2 Rabin Public-Key Cryptosystem

In contrast to the RSA scheme, the Rabin Public-Key Cryptosystem has been proven to be as secure as factorizing large integers is difficult. Again the receiver forms the product $n = pq$ of two large distinct primes $p$ and $q$ that are kept secret. To make decoding efficient, $p$ and $q$ are normally chosen to be both congruent to 3 (mod 4). This time, the sender encodes the message $m \in \{0, 1, \ldots, n - 1\}$ as

$$c = \mathcal{E}_e(m) = m^2 \pmod{n}.$$ 

To decode the message, the receiver must be able to compute square roots modulo $n$. This can be efficiently accomplished in terms of integers $x$ and $y$ satisfying $1 = xp + yq$. First one notes from Lemma 6.1 that the equation $0 = x^2 - c$ has at most two solutions in $\mathbb{Z}_p$. In fact, these solutions are given by $\pm a$, where $a = c^{(p+1)/4} \pmod{p}$:

$$(\pm a)^2 = c^{(p+1)/2} \pmod{p} = cc^{(p-1)/2} \pmod{p} = cm^{(p-1)} \pmod{p} = c \pmod{p}. $$

Similarly, the two square roots of $c$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ are $\pm b$, where $b = c^{(q+1)/4} \pmod{q}$. Consequently, by the Chinese remainder theorem, the linear congruences

$$M = \pm a \pmod{p}, \quad M = \pm b \pmod{q}$$

yield four solutions:

$$M = \pm (ayq \pm bxp) \pmod{n},$$

one of which is the original message $m$.

8.C Discrete Logarithm Schemes

The RSA system is based on the trapdoor property that multiplying two large prime numbers is much easier than factoring a large composite number into two constituent primes. Another example of such a one-way function is the fact that computing a high power of an element within a group is much easier than the reverse process of determining the required exponent.

8.C.1 Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange

Definition: Let $G$ be a finite group and $b \in G$. Suppose $y \in G$ can be obtained as the power $b^x$ in $G$. The number $x$ is called the discrete logarithm of $y$ to the base $b$ in $G$. 

Remark: The Diffie–Hellman assumption conjectures that it is computationally infeasible to compute $\alpha^{ab}$ knowing only $\alpha^a$ and $\alpha^b$. It is assumed that this would require first determining one of the powers $a$ or $b$ (in which case it is difficult as computing a discrete logarithm).

Let $F_q$ be a publicly agreed upon field with $q$ elements, with primitive element $\alpha$. If Alice and Bob want to agree on a common secret key, they each secretly choose a random integer between 1 and $q - 1$, which they call $a$ and $b$, respectively. Alice computes and sends $\alpha^a$ to Bob; likewise, Bob computes and sends $\alpha^b$ to Alice. Their common secret key is then $\alpha^{ab}$. If the Diffie–Hellman assumption is correct, a third party will be unable to determine $\alpha^{ab}$ from knowledge of the public keys $\alpha^a$ and $\alpha^b$ alone.

In the ElGamal Cryptosystem, Alice sends a message $m$ to Bob as the pair of elements $(\alpha^k, m\alpha^{bk})$, where $k$ is a randomly chosen integer. Bob can then determine $m$ by dividing $m\alpha^{bk}$ by $(\alpha^k)^b$.

### 8.C.2 Okamoto Authentication Scheme

One of the more difficult issues in public key cryptography is that of authentication, that is, verifying the identity of a sender or receiver. For example, Alice should not blindly assume that Bob’s posted public key is really his, without independent confirmation via a trusted source. And Bob, when he decrypts a message from Alice, should not naively believe that it was really Alice who used his public encoding key to send the message to him in the first place.

A trusted authority (perhaps the government?) might issue Alice an electronic certificate based on more conventional forms of identification (such as a passport, driver’s license, or birth certificate), which Alice would like to then use to authenticate herself while communicating with Bob. However, Alice can’t simply send Bob her secret identification code. Even if she encrypted it with Bob’s public key, there would always be the risk that Bob might later use Alice’s identification to impersonate her! Obviously, part of Alice’s identification must be kept secret.

One practical scheme for doing this is the Okamoto authentication scheme, a variation of an earlier scheme by Schnorr. A trusted certifying authority chooses a field $\mathbb{Z}_p$, where the prime $p$ is chosen such that $p - 1$ has a large prime factor $q$. The authority also chooses two distinct elements of order $q$ in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, say $g_1$ and $g_2$. To request a certificate, Alice chooses two secret random exponents $a_1$ and $a_2$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ and sends the number

$$s = g_1^{-a_1} g_2^{-a_2} \pmod{p}.$$ 

to the trusted authority, who uses a secret algorithm to generate an identifying certificate $C(s)$ for Alice. When Alice communicates with Bob, she identifies herself by sending him both her signature $s$ and certificate $C(s)$. She can then authenticate herself to Bob with the following procedure.
Bob first checks with the trusted authority to confirm that \( s \) and \( C(s) \) really belong to Alice. But since \( s \) and \( C(s) \) aren’t secret, this doesn’t yet establish that Alice was really the one who sent them to Bob. So Bob challenges the person claiming to be Alice to prove that she really owns the signature \( s \), by first sending her a random number \( r \in \mathbb{Z}_q \).

Alice now tries to prove to Bob that she owns the underlying private keys \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \), without actually revealing them to him, by choosing random numbers \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) and sending him the three numbers

\[
y_1 = k_1 + a_1r \pmod{q},
\]

\[
y_2 = k_2 + a_2r \pmod{q},
\]

\[
\gamma = g_1^{k_1}g_2^{k_2} \pmod{p}.
\]

Bob uses the fact that \( g_1^q = g_2^q = 1 \pmod{p} \) and the value of \( s \) to verify in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) that

\[
g_1^{y_1}g_2^{y_2}s^r = g_1^{k_1 + a_1r}g_2^{k_2 + a_2r} = g_1^{k_1}g_2^{k_2} = \gamma \pmod{p}.
\]

The agreement of the numbers \( g_1^{y_1}g_2^{y_2}s^r \) and \( \gamma \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) begins to convince Bob that maybe he really is talking to Alice after all.

But the question is, is it possible that a third party, say Charlie, is impersonating Alice, having somehow devised a clever algorithm to determine numbers \( y'_1 \) and \( y'_2 \) that fool Bob into thinking the sender is Alice? We now show that impersonation under the [Okamoto authentication scheme](#) is as difficult as solving the discrete logarithm problem.

Suppose Charlie has managed to find a way to convince Bob that he is Alice. That is, without knowing Alice’s secret key, he has figured out a clever way to generate two exponents \( y'_1 \) and \( y'_2 \) such that

\[
g_1^{y'_1}g_2^{y'_2}s^{r'} = \gamma \pmod{p},
\]

no matter what challenge \( r' \) Bob sends him. Suppose he uses his algorithm again, for a distinct challenge \( r'' \neq r' \), to determine exponents \( y''_1 \) and \( y''_2 \):

\[
g_1^{y''_1}g_2^{y''_2}s^{r''} = \gamma \pmod{p}.
\]

Then

\[
g_1^{y'_1-y''_1} = g_2^{y'_2-y''_2}s^{r''-r'} \pmod{p},
\]

and so

\[
g_1^{(r''-r')^{-1}(y'_1-y''_1)}g_2^{(r''-r')^{-1}(y'_2-y''_2)} = s.
\]

Charlie has thus determined two exponents \( a'_1 \) and \( a'_2 \) such that

\[
s = g_1^{-a'_1}g_2^{-a'_2} \pmod{p}.
\]
8.C. DISCRETE LOGARITHM SCHEMES

It is not hard to show, when $q$ is sufficiently large, that for virtually all possible challenges $r'$ and $r''$, the resulting pair of exponents $(a'_1, a'_2)$ will be distinct from Alice’s exponents $(a_1, a_2)$ (for example, see Stinson [1995]). Without loss of generality, we can relabel these exponents so that $a_2 \neq a'_2$.

Together with Alice’s original construction

$$s = g_1^{-a_1} g_2^{-a_2} \pmod{p},$$

Charlie’s scheme would then constitute a computationally feasible algorithm for computing $\log_{g_1} g_2$ in $\mathbb{Z}_p$: we would know

$$g_1^{a_1-a'_1} = g_2^{a'_2-a_2} \pmod{p},$$

so that, on using the fact that $a'_2 \neq a_2$,

$$\log_{g_1} g_2 = (a'_2 - a_2)^{-1} (a_1 - a'_1).$$

Note that since $g_1$ and $g_2$ were chosen by the trusted authority, neither Alice nor Charlie had any prior knowledge of the value $\log_{g_1} g_2$.

8.C.3 Digital Signature Standard

Another situation that arises frequently is where Bob hasn’t yet gone to the trouble of creating a public key, but Alice would nevertheless like to send him an electronically signed document. Her electronic signature should guarantee not only that she is the sender, but also that the document hasn’t been tampered with during transmission. One means for doing this is the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) proposed in 1991 by the U.S. government National Institute of Standards and Technology as a standard for electronically signing documents.

In the DSS, a large prime $p$ is chosen such that $p - 1$ has a large prime factor $q$ and an element $g$ of order $q$ is chosen from $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Alice’s chooses as her private key the random integer $a$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Her public key is $A = g^a$. Alice first applies to her document $x$ a hash function $f$, which is essentially a function that maps a long string of characters to a much shorter one, such that it is computationally infeasible to find another document $x'$ such that $f(x') = f(x)$ (even though such an $x'$ will likely exist). This makes it virtually impossible to tamper with the document without altering the hash value. The short string of characters given by the hash is converted to an integer $h$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

Alice now chooses a random number $k$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ and finds an integer $s$ such that $sk = h + ag^k \pmod{q}$, where $g^k \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. She signs her document with the pair $(g^k, s)$.

Bob can verify the authenticity and integrity of the document he receives by first calculating its hash $h$. He then uses Alice’s public key $A$ to check that

$$g^{s^{-1}h} A^{s^{-1}g^k} = g^{s^{-1}(h+ag^k)} = g^k \pmod{p}.$$

If this is indeed the case then Bob is convinced that the contents and signature are genuine.
8.C.4 Silver–Pohlig–Hellman Discrete Logarithm Algorithm

As it happens, a fast means for computing discrete logarithms in $F_q$, the Silver–Pohlig–Hellman algorithm, is known if all of the prime factors $p$ of $q - 1$ are small. For this reason, care must be taken when choosing the size $q$ of the field used in cryptographic schemes that rely on the Diffie–Hellman assumption.

To find $x$ such that $b^x = y$ in $F_q$, it suffices to find $x \mod p^{a_p}$ for each prime factor $p$ of $q - 1$, where $a_p$ is the number of $p$ factors appearing in the prime factorization of $q - 1$. The Chinese remainder theorem can then be used to solve the simultaneous congruence problem that determines the value of $x$.

For each prime factor $p$, we first compute a table of the $p$th roots of unity $b^{j(q-1)/p}$ for $j = 0, 1, \ldots, p - 1$, noting that $b^{q-1} = 1$ in the field $F_q$.

To find $x \mod p^{a_p}$, we attempt to compute each of the coefficients in the $p$-ary expansion of $x \mod p^{a_p}$:

$$x = x_0 + x_1 p + \ldots + x_{a_p-1} p^{a_p-1} \mod p^{a_p}.$$  

For example, to find $x_0$, we compute the $p$th root of unity $y^{(q-1)/p}$. But $y^{(q-1)/p} = b^{x_0(q-1)/p} = b^{x_0(q-1)/p}$, so in our table of $p$th roots, $x_0$ is just the $j$ value corresponding to the root $y^{(q-1)/p}$.

To find $x_1$, we repeat the above procedure replacing $y$ with $y_1 = y b^{-x_0} = b^{y-x_0}$, which has the discrete logarithm $x_1 p + \ldots + x_{a_p-1} p^{a_p-1}$. Since $y_1$ is evidently a $p$th power, we see that $y_1^{(q-1)/p} = 1$ in $F_q$ and $y_1^{(q-1)/p^2} = b^{(y-x_0)(q-1)/p^2} = y_1^{x_1(q-1)/p}$ is the $p$th root of unity corresponding to $j = x_1$. Continuing in this manner, we can compute each of the $x_i$ values for $i = 0, 1, \ldots, a - 1$. Once we have found $x \mod p^{a_p}$ for each prime factor $p$ of $q - 1$, we can use the Chinese remainder theorem to find $x$ itself.

8.D Cryptographic Error-Correcting Codes

We conclude with an interesting cryptographic application of error-correcting codes due to McEliece [1978]. The receiver selects a block size $k$ and a private key consisting of an $[n, k; 2t+1]$ linear code $C$ with generator matrix $G$, a $k \times k$ nonsingular scrambler matrix $S$, and an $n \times n$ random permutation matrix $P$. He then constructs the $k \times n$ matrix $K = SGP$ as his public key. A sender encodes each message block $m$ as

$$c = E_e(m) = mK + z,$$

where $z$ is a random error vector of length $n$ and weight no more than $t$. The receiver then computes

$$cP^{-1} = (mK + z)P^{-1} = (mSGP + z)P^{-1} = mSG + zP^{-1}.$$  

Since the weight of $zP^{-1}$ is no more than $t$, he can use the code $C$ to decode the vector $mSG + zP^{-1}$ to the codeword $mS$. After multiplication on the right by $S^{-1}$, he recovers the original message $m$. 
Bibliography


Index

(n, M, d) code, 9
A_q(n, d), 11
F_q[x], 58
[n, k, d] code, 23
[n, k] code, 23
|C|, 27
\( \div, 7 \)
q-ary symmetric channel, 6

affine cipher, 79
alphabet, 7
authentication, 87

balanced block design, 17
basis vectors, 23
BCH code, 66
binary, 8
binary adders, 57
binary ascending form, 41
binary code, 7
binary codewords, 7
binary Hamming code, 39
binary symmetric, 6
bit, 8

Block substitution ciphers, 79
blocks, 17
Bose–Chaudhuri–Hocquenghem (BCH) codes, 66

check polynomial, 62
Chinese remainder theorem, 83
ciphers, 78
code, 8
codeword, 7
correct, 10
coset, 26
coset leaders, 27
cryptosystem, 78
cyclic, 57
cyclotomic coset, 54

Data Encryption Standard (DES), 80
design distance, 66
detect, 10
differential cryptanalysis, 81
Diffie–Hellman assumption, 87
Digital Signature Standard, 89
Digraph ciphers, 79
discrete logarithm, 86

ElGamal Cryptosystem, 87
encode, 26
envelopes, 81
equivalent, 13, 25
error locator polynomial, 67
error polynomial, 67
error vector, 28
Euler indicator, 50
Euler totient, 50
extended Golay, 44

Feistel, 80
flip-flops, 57
frequency analysis, 79

generate, 23
generated, 58
generator matrix, 23
generator polynomial, 59

Hamming bound, 14
Hamming code, 39
Hamming distance, 8
hash, 89
Hill cipher, 79
ideal, 58
incidence matrix, 18
information digits, 41
irreducible, 60
linear block, 79
linear code, 23
linear cryptanalysis, 81
man-in-the-middle, 81
metric, 8
minimal polynomial, 52, 53
minimum distance, 9
minimum weight, 24
monic, 59
monoalphabetic substitution ciphers, 79
nearest-neighbour substitution ciphers, 8
null space, 30
Okamoto authentication scheme, 87
one-way function, 86
order, 48, 51
parity-check digits, 41
parity-check matrix, 30
perfect code, 15
permutation cipher, 80
permutation matrix, 90
points, 17
polyalphabetic substitution ciphers, 79
polynomial ring, 58
primitive BCH code, 66
primitive element, 52, 63
primitive polynomial, 53, 64
principal ideal, 58
Principal Ideal Domain, 58
public-key cryptosystems, 78
Rabin Public-Key Cryptosystem, 86
rate, 29
reciprocal polynomial, 63
reduced echelon form, 25
redundancy, 50
Reed–Solomon, 73
repetition code, 7
residue class ring, 58
Rijndael Cryptosystem, 81
Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) Cryptosystem, 81
Schnorr, 87
scrambler matrix, 30
self-dual, 45
self-orthogonal, 45
shift cipher, 78
shift registers, 57
Silver–Pohlig–Hellman algorithm, 90
singleton, 73
size, 8
Slepian, 27
span, 23
sphere-packing, 14
Sphere-Packing Bound, 14
standard array, 27
standard form, 25, 31
symmetric, 18
symmetric matrix, 45
symmetric-key cryptosystems, 78
syndrome, 31
syndrome decoding, 31
ternary, 8
trapdoor property, 56
triangle inequality, 8
Triple-DES, 81
trivially perfect codes, 15
Vandermonde matrix, 70
weight, 9
weighted check sum, 20